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INTRABLOC

Leka Trains Military Forces Abroad To 'Assist' Albanians

90EB0278A Belgrade NOVOSTI OSAM
in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 90 pp 26-27

[Interview with Albanian King Leka I by Momcilo Popovic, place and date not given: "Leaflets From Balloons"]

[Text] In recent weeks, self-designated King Leka I, the pretender to the Albanian throne who lives in exile in Johannesburg, South Africa, has given several provocative statements to West European journalists. In doing so, he has not refrained from fairly crude assessments of the political situation in Yugoslavia, or from promoting his own view of the geography of a "future free Albania."

OSMICA, feeling that it would be more reasonable to ask him specific questions than to debate certain irrational positions of his, offered to interview him. "His Majesty" agreed to this, but nevertheless avoiding answering certain questions. That very fact, of course, in spite of his exaggerated protocolary manners, demonstrates how willing Leka I is to talk openly and objectively about the numerous controversies over him and his positions. Some of the answers we did receive also gave the same impression.

"His Royal Excellency" Leka I, in any case, was born in Albania in 1939. His father, Ahmedbeg Zogu, was the Albanian prime minister until 1924, when his feudal regime was overthrown in an uprising led by Fana Noli, a democrat, a Harvard student, a translator of Cervantes and Shakespeare, a poet, and a composer. Ahmedbeg Zogu then fled to Yugoslavia, but returned after only a few months with the assistance of the Belgrade court and the royal army. He overthrew Noli and established himself as head of state, and then in 1928 proclaimed himself the "king of the Albanians, the sons of eagles." Although he placed Albania under the "protection" of Italy, he refused to join the Italian empire, and so he emigrated in 1939 when faced with the invasion of the fascist troops.

Leka I, born only two days before his family fled Albania, but subsequently sentenced to life in exile, has never given up his intention to "return to his homeland and his people," as he states himself. How realistic his political views are, and what the intellectual atmosphere of the "Albanian court in exile" is like, can be indirectly deduced from a description of the surroundings in which he recently spoke with a French journalist in his Paris "branch office": "In the spacious dining room of the villa in the Paris suburbs, a person feels a bit heroic, as if witnessing some monarchic achievement, but at the same time confused, in looking at the strange royal family that wants to regain the rights that it feels belong to it. Eight-year-old Leka II, the son of Leka I, acts lost and miserable. He is a lost child in a lost kingdom, dressed in an oversized sweater with the royal coat of

arms. The two women next to him—his mother Susan, born in Australia, and his grandmother, Queen Mother Geraldine, are obviously bored as the photographer tries to immortalize their faces," wrote the French journalist.

This royal family "conducts Albanian affairs" wherever it resides. After the death of her husband, King Zogu, in 1961, the Queen Mother took up residence in Madrid, and her son Leka I, after wandering throughout the entire world, took up residence in Johannesburg.

"When the Italian troops attacked our country," stated Leka I, "my father sent me, my mother, and her sisters to Greece. He joined us himself afterwards, and so we left together for Turkey, and three months later for Bulgaria. We kept moving around Europe, because the Italians wanted to capture my father. We thus passed through the Baltic countries and reached France, where we remained until its collapse. We actually left Paris eight days before the Germans entered it. We sailed on the last ship for England, where we lived until the end of the war. Afterwards we went to Egypt, and in 1954 returned to France. We lived for years in Cannes and Paris, where my father died. In 1962 we moved to Spain, and lived there until 1979. My mother stayed in Madrid, and we moved to Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, and then to South Africa, where we have lived for the last 10 years."

His residence in a Johannesburg suburb is protected by only one bodyguard, although he claims that there have been as many as six attempts to kill him in recent years.

"I do not have a great deal of protection because I am an optimist. After all, I feel that the end of my wait to return to my homeland is approaching. This year will be very strenuous, and so I sent my staff on vacation, because later on they will not have much opportunity for that," Leka I stated.

The above-mentioned bodyguard, however, is evidently armed and professionally trained. He carefully scrutinizes every visitor at all times. Six boxer dogs are also on hand the whole time. Leka I himself, who is somewhat over 180 centimeters in height, carries a pistol and an ornamental knife on his belt.

"A pistol and a knife on one's belt," he explained, "are part of our tradition. That is the custom for all adult Albanians."

Like some comic strip hero, Leka I believes that the six attempted assassinations were organized "from Yugoslavia," "in response to my critical positions concerning Kosovo." Although he did not cite any evidence, he "knows" this. Asked, first of all, how much he knew about the current situation in Albania and how he viewed it, "His Majesty" answered emotionally:

[Leka I] For years now, I have been extremely well informed about all events in my country. At the end of last month, the unrest, or popular rebellion, in Shkoder and Kukes was ruthlessly suppressed. That is only temporary, however, since the reports that I have been

receiving indicate that morale in the army and Sigurimi [Albanian security service] there is very low, and the ruling hierarchy has become corrupt.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Has your money also been involved in that?

[Leka I] No. They are spending the people's money. For a long time, Albania has lived in a vacuum, and the people are under great pressure from the hated atheistic regime, which does not know how to rule the state. The people are suffering, because they cannot reach the standard of living that people deserve in the present day.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Have you had any contacts at all with Ramiz Alija, the current Albanian president?

[Leka I] Even though I was sentenced in absentia to death as an "enemy of the people," I have tried to explain my views to Alija. It was in vain.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Have you had any problems with Sigurimi agents?

[Leka I] They constantly try to infiltrate our organizations, just like the agents of other countries, especially from the Yugoslav intelligence service. That creates certain problems for us, because our intelligence service has to lose time uncovering them.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Who has an interest in killing you?

[Leka I] My fate has always been in the hands of the Almighty. I am responsible only to the Albanian people, and that will continue to be the case, until the entire nation can freely and democratically elect a government that it wants to follow. I gain enemies among those who are threatened by our legitimate aspirations.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Doesn't it seem to you that you are exaggerating when you spread crude assessments of the situation in Kosovo?

[Leka I] The Albanian people obviously want to be reunited and to be masters of their own fate. As their legitimate leader, who has only their interests in mind, I will do everything possible to contribute to the reunification of ethnically Albanian areas with their homeland. Naturally, the circumstances and methods that will lead to reunification will depend entirely upon the ability of our neighbors to understand our goals. I particularly want to emphasize that I believe in a good-neighbor policy as the most healthy way to maintain stability in an area that has known suffering for a long time and has been the direct cause of two world wars. It would thus be best to achieve our goals without bloodshed. Wouldn't it be more rational to talk to your neighbors about the future of the ethnically Albanian areas in Yugoslavia, instead of exacerbating the divisions, as is now being done in Kosovo with the aid of special units from the federal government in Belgrade?

[NOVOSTI OSAM] You are talking about "reunification," although Kosovo has never belonged to Albania

and although Serbs, Montenegrins, and several other Slavic peoples have lived in that region for centuries.

[Leka I] Viewed historically, the Slavs are recent arrivals in the areas that they now occupy. It is true that there are parts of Kosovo that have special significance for Serbs. I would be going too far if I were to deny those facts. I want to go a step further, however, and say that if we sat down with the Serbian and Yugoslav government and discussed this, we would surely arrive at some kind of common interests. For example, the holy monasteries, so extolled and celebrated, and the monument to the famous Battle of Kosovo, could be designated and recognized as extraterritorial by both sides. That is the status that embassies have in other countries.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] You apparently do not imagine that Yugoslavia could not accept such an option.

[Leka I] The problems concerning Kosovo can be solved only with good will on both sides. It has to be understood that the reunification of the Albanian people is necessary, and that it is only under that condition that good-neighborly relations can be constructed.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Would possible democratic changes in Albania improve chances for normalizing relations with Yugoslavia?

[Leka I] I sincerely believe that the election of a democratic government in Albania would also be the best way to achieve cooperation, until such time as it is understood that the Albanian people cannot remain divided.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] On several previous occasions, you have mentioned some sort of Balkan confederation. What do you mean by that, and which countries would be part of it?

[Leka I] At the present time, it is necessary to realize that small countries like the Balkan ones, which are inhabited by different ethnic groups, which have different religions and customs, and which have different cultural heritages, have a great deal of difficulty living in peace, and cooperating with each other, unless they respect those differences. If we begin to respect each other, good will will respond to good will, and good economic and commercial alliances will also follow. In such conditions, even completely independent nations can think about associating in a confederation, primarily for economic and defense reasons. Each nation in such a confederation would be independent. Mutual relations would be regulated by treaties and agreements, and not by the domination of some over others.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] In addition to the royal court, there is also an "Albanian government in exile." What are your relations with its members?

[Leka I] As the leader of the primary opposition to the Albanian dictatorship, I have contacts with many parties with different political ideas. As such, I represent the

opinion of the majority of the Albanian people. Furthermore, since the Albanian monarchy was never overthrown by the will of the people, but rather by an act of aggression on the part of fascist Italy in 1939, the Albanian government in exile never ceased to exist. Its duties are numerous, and it will continue to keep the torch of freedom alive until the time comes when the nation elects its own government in a free, democratic, and nationwide referendum.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] If the Albanian people accepted your return, what would your monarchy be like?

[Leka I] It would naturally be a constitutional monarchy, as it was first established by the 1928 Constitution.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] What would be the status of religion in such a state?

[Leka I] The 1928 Constitution designates the king as the protector of all religions. The king has the right to choose his own religion, like any citizen. As you know, I am a Moslem, but all religions would be treated equally and protected.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] What are your relations with the large number of Albanians living in the West?

[Leka I] My relations with my fellow countrymen throughout the world have always been excellent. I have always been ready to listen to their problems and understand their natural needs, and even to help them if I am able to do so. That is true of my relations with all Albanian emigre political parties and groups, and God willing, that will continue to be true.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] The West European press has written several times about a certain "Kosovo Prince" Krieziu. Who is he, and where did he get such a title?

[Leka I] I did not know that my relative Esad Krieziu was using that title. In any case, he is the son of my aunt, Princess Nafija, who was married to Cenabeg Krieziu.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] What do you plan to undertake next for your people in Albania?

[Leka I] That is a very sensitive question, because I do not want to publicize my intentions in advance.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Recently, however, you issued a "royal proclamation," and sent it to your people in Albania.

[Leka I] Yes. In it, I called upon the Albanian people and the Albanian armed forces to work together to overthrow the illegitimate and illegal regime, which is continuing its tyranny and subjugation of our beloved brothers and sisters. That proclamation has already been smuggled into Albania, and leaflets containing it will soon be dropped into several cities from balloons.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] You live fairly luxuriously. A few years ago, you were accused of being an arms dealer. How do you earn your living?

[Leka I] I supported myself by working as a representative of various large companies, and recently I started my own business, selling consumer goods. Those accusations of arms dealing are rumors that have been going around for a long time. It was claimed that I was dealing in drugs and women. Those were crude attacks upon my person. I have never been an arms dealer. Of course, it is true that I have occasionally purchased weapons for our units, for the resistance... When that is necessary for us, for our people, I do it, and never for profit.

[NOVOSTI OSAM] Does that mean that you have some sort of army of your own?

[Leka I] We have always tried to create military forces that would assist the people in Albania. They have been training for years in many countries.

BULGARIA

Dimitrov Interviewed on BZNS Plans

*90BA0011A Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT
in Bulgarian 23 Feb 90 p 4*

[Interview with Angel Dimitrov, secretary of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, by correspondent of the Fatherland Front Daily (FFD) Zhechka Danailova; place and date not given: "Before the BZNS 36th Special Congress; Maximum Respect and Loyalty for Political Partners"]

[Text] [FFD] What does the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] expect from the forthcoming congress and what political platform will it present to the Union and the people?

[Dimitrov] We are organizing preparation activities such as annual meetings and pre-congress conferences for the BZNS 36th special congress that are unique in our experience. At this time, all high level representatives of agrarian associations such as those belonging to the Administrative Council, Supreme Union Council, and Finance and Auditing Commission will be specified directly by the delegates to the Obshtina conferences and Oblast pre-congress meetings. It will not be possible to manipulate people and to impose unfamiliar names on them. Every organization has the right to be represented in the Administrative Council and other Union institutions depending on the size of its membership. This democratic process is introduced for the first time in 45 years. We are presenting an open program, on which we worked very hard and used the broad participation of specialists and the personal participation of thousands of members of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, who enriched it through oral statements and written suggestions. We will continue to improve it during the congress, so that it can truly unite efforts and create conditions for an authoritative and modern political party which will participate on equal terms in the political pluralism of

our country. Similarly, the by-laws which we are preparing will be fundamentally different from those used until now.

[FFD] To what extent is the BZNS ready to participate in the elections as an equal political partner and what is your opinion of a future coalition government? Aren't its ranks still weakened because of the deliberate limitations used in accepting new Union members?

[Dimitrov] We are fighting for political influence like any other party. We have our own political infrastructure and we have our own constituents. Regardless of the critical comments presented now, BZNS leadership tactics are shaping it more and more as an independent political party and we will have an important position in the parliament after the forthcoming elections.

Regarding our participation in the elections and joining certain coalition collaboration: We feel we cannot yet make any definite statements on the issue because the election law has not yet been approved, and no election system has been confirmed which will predominate and have priority importance. The type of election system we decide to rely upon will also determine the position we take in joining various ideas for coalition groupings. I am firmly convinced that we must all orient ourselves toward the type of government that will be able to get the country out of the difficult political and economic situation prevailing now, and out of the cultural crisis affecting Bulgarian society. Getting out of this situation can be accomplished only through a broad government of national accord. We are deeply convinced that only such government will set up true democratic elections, find the way toward more effective and true methods, collaborate to take apart the centralized system, and last but not least, be accepted as truly democratic by the developed countries, which can accept us in the various organizations of Western Europe only under these conditions.

It is true, we refused to participate in the present government, but we have not joined the opposition; we have not gone to the other side of the round table. This must be very clearly understood, in spite of those who now seek ways to go against our position. We will not participate in the SDS [UDF, Union of Democratic Forces] because we have fundamental differences. At the same time we are responsible for everything which the government has done and in which we participated until yesterday. But at the same time we will cooperate constructively with the government in such ways which are not against our views, our positions, and the goals and tasks of our program. We protest vehemently against the round table's past activities. We understand well that it is a new and interesting form of democracy for all social forces. But no results at all have been achieved for a whole month. Not a single issue has been resolved.

[FFD] Do you believe that there will be true unification of the N. Petkov BZNS and what prevents it now from establishing accord?

[Dimitrov] BZNS unification is very important to us during this preelection work. I am an optimist because this is everyone's goal. We conducted four meetings during which we arrived at almost complete agreement to start implementing unification from top to bottom. But after the recent N. Petkov BZNS national conference on 3 February, there was a reversal in the temporary leadership's attitude toward this issue. So now, when the call to unite has become the membership's spontaneous wish we are met with the resistance of this temporary central leadership. For example, in Varna, its Sofia representatives have penalized those who signed a declaration of unity. In our opinion, there are established conditions from the bottom up to go ahead with unification without asking the central leadership. We have made available clubhouses, telephones, printing facilities; we are organizing meetings, sessions, and conferences, so that this process can be completed faster. We are deeply convinced that without unity we cannot expect serious preelection results. I am an optimist, because the united members of the N. Petkov BZNS will not reconcile with the resistance they are facing and will achieve unification.

[FFD] At some meetings you have been accused of sympathizing with the totalitarian system. What will you reply to your political opponents?

[Dimitrov] This is not without some reason and it gives rise to quite a bit of mistrust: How is it possible for these same people to restructure themselves so fast? I have always said that at a given stage of development in the country each individual party brings forth its leaders. We had the difficult task of bringing the BZNS to a special congress; there will be plenty of intelligent delegates who will think of the future and will elect their own leadership. By tradition, the mandate of the present Standing Committee is over and new leadership will be elected at the congress.

According to the new by-laws we are proposing and which will probably be accepted, the BZNS secretary will be elected by the entire congress [Words indistinct] it is possible that our organization will elect its first leader by itself, and from several candidates at that. Young people with new ideas and thinking will enter the BZNS Standing Committee.

[FFD] Can you explain the unwillingness to remove primary party organizations from the workplace?

[Dimitrov] We are all deeply convinced that in the case of a multiparty political system, which will be true for Bulgaria in the future, and after the parliamentary elections, it is not possible for one party to have organizations at the workplace and others not. On the other hand, if we create equal conditions for all, then enterprises and offices will turn into political clubs. Instead of work, there will be political activities and speeches. We cannot understand the hard-line position of the BCP on this

issue. Our political partners must realize that their position is illogical and must agree to resolve this fundamental problem.

[FFD] Will BZNS remain within the framework of the Fatherland Front?

[Dimitrov] We value highly the role of the Fatherland Front in the September 9th Revolution when it united the broad strata of the people in ameliorating the deep wounds inflicted by the war, and in restoring the economy during the first period in the development of people's democracy. Political types, far removed from the progressive vision toward which the Fatherland Front government was striving on 9 September 1944 also came under the Front's banner. But they were united by the common idea for Bulgaria's well-being. We have recently reviewed the organization's future several times already. We feel that there is no way it can exist in its past form under the new conditions. Of 276 Fatherland Front Obshtina committees, BZNS had paid staff in only 75; party nonmembers had even fewer. This is an organization for joint work of Communists, agrarian union members, and people who are not members of the party. It must become an open home for a permanent round table, where the efforts of all who care for Bulgaria are united, be they formal or informal, religious or atheist, and all others must be given shelter by the Fatherland Front, so that issues, for which there is no room nor other organization to unite their efforts, can be discussed. Self-government of territorial communities and overall people's control over the infrastructure activities of each given territory must be organized through the Fatherland Front. In this respect, BZNS declares that it will especially support Fatherland Front. In the opposite case, we will be against it.

Sobriety, unity, meaningfulness: These are words more and more frequently encountered in our political vocabulary. Great internal political events are about to take place in which stormy social processes will determine the road of the future and perhaps Bulgaria's fate. Everyone should find his own, albeit modest, role and accept his responsibility in society's development; maybe this is what we have been missing until now.

Role of Alternative Socialist Organization Analyzed
90EB0309A Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 14 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Mila Manova and Dora Chichkova: "Balance and Self-Determination Conference"]

[Text] The dynamics of the political situation in the country demand maintaining an unparalleled pace in the activities of a great variety of parties, associations, and trends. In a period of two months the Alternate Socialist Association (ASO), which is a BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] faction, has already held one national conference, participated in the 14th Extraordinary BCP Congress, and intensively worked on the drafting of a

platform and other political documents for gaining supporters among party members and outside the party.

The Second ASO National Conference could be generally described as a conference of balance and self-determination, and differentiation of views on the future. The results of the extraordinary party congress were a litmus test of such positions, revealing, in the course of the practical activities, different approaches based on the disparity between expectations and achievements.

The report submitted by Ivan Nikolov, as a base for discussion, called for a serious analysis of the real participation of the alternate association in party life, which, along with other "left wing" platforms, plays the role of an internal political force which accelerates its radicalizing. The shaping of the BCP as a party of a new type through the unification of party and nonparty members in the struggle for building a democratic society is one of the objectives which remain relevant. This is a natural process and not a one-time act and, on the basis of this understanding, the stage which was crossed, although assessed as unsatisfactory, contains certain positive steps.

The report stated that the authority of the ASO has increased. Its number of supporters has increased as well and its ideas have become more extensively publicized. Particular attention was paid to the participation of ASO members in the extraordinary party congress, where an initial attempt was made to interact with other associations. The attendance of ASO delegates was assessed as showing inconsistency, contradictoriness, and a split between centrifugal and centripetal aspirations.

The critical enthusiasm of the reporter in terms of the results of the work of the congress itself as a whole was supported by a number of arguments: the obvious fact that the party is in a difficult situation was not considered; no full assessment was made of the party's past and a harmful cadre compromise was allowed to occur; in the aspiration to preserve unity at all costs the need for more radical decisions on a number of matters was ignored. A particularly sharp attack was mounted on the holding of elections for leading bodies. Due to the fact that they contain innovative ideas as well as the traits of the past, the congress documents themselves were characterized as a very hesitant step forward.

A number of reasons were stressed in support of the fact that the ASO should, in the future as well, develop as a faction within the party, within the context of the current overall situation in the country and the forthcoming elections.

Stormy and at times dramatic discussions were triggered not only by the report but also by the declaration read by Nikolay Vasilev on the work of the initiative group on the drafting of new documents and the founding of a new Alternate Socialist Party.

The split within the ASO is a fact which most accurately reflected the mood in the hall and the views of those attending.

Repeated statements were made to the effect that the alternate association has become a screen and a decoration in the efforts to compromise between the reform wing in the BCP leadership and the conservative forces, and that a movement exists toward a centrist orientation, which involves the irreconcilable (as they assess themselves) radicals. Without quoting them textually, let us briefly quote part of them.

Asen Davidov: We do not realize fully the objective realities. Yes, now the ASO is looked at differently. It was considered as the most radical wing in the party but the documents adopted at the congress conflict with its views.

Filip Lazarov: The congress indicated that the BCP cannot reform itself "from within."

Velizar Aleksiev: At our meeting in Varna the majority spoke out in favor of leaving the party, for it believes that it is impossible to efficiently oppose the conservative forces.

Borislav Popov: We cannot hope for any real change in the BCP; it has "genetically" inherited and established approaches which conflict with today's requirements.

The replies from the hall frequently disagreed with the "virtually intact preservation of the old structures" and with not having any changes in the municipalities and oblasts. Particularly sharp debates took place concerning the structure of the supreme leading party authority and its rights. On the basis of such views, suggestions were made of undertaking the immediate establishment of a new party and demanding the holding of a new extraordinary party congress.

Such were the views held by an extreme segment of those present, expressed in a very violent fashion. They objected to listening to people who thought differently.

Another part of the ASO representatives, also not concealing their dissatisfaction with their own work and that of the extraordinary congress, nonetheless expressed the opposite view. The appeal to seek ways leading to the future, not only from the viewpoint of the interests of the ASO but also of the general-party and national viewpoints, met with understanding by many people. The potential readiness of a large part of the party members in the country, particularly after the congress, of following a more radical trend in their thoughts was one of the strongest arguments in this sense, along with the warning of the danger of the eventual withdrawal of the faction from the BCP, which would strengthen the positions of the conservatives by depriving them of opposition.

Boycho Kokinov: The BCP includes many honest communists who continue to believe in a great variety of dogmas. They have read neither Lenin nor his opponents

but insist on the preservation of some concepts which have become compromised. This becomes a religious dispute. The Bulgarian Communists need time for these things and for the problems which are facing us to be clarified. We cannot demand of our people all of a sudden to become radicalized.

Koprinka Chervenкова: I see the sense of the faction remaining within the party also in forcing the conservative democrats to identify themselves, which will make the battle easier.

Violeta Mandeva: In Varna the authority of the ASO has clearly increased. More moderate party members, but people who have been threatened for years, are beginning to join us. They will not join a new party but have already become mature enough to join the ASO.

Anzhel Vagenshtayn: At the congress, the nomenclature and the apparat once again showed their true nature. And we, as though we could have expected anything else, became angry and are thinking of leaving. What makes sense is not for us to leave but to work in such a way as to make them leave the party.

Unfortunately, the second part of the conference took place precisely under the sign of confrontation. Voices which tried to point out that the processes were dialectically too complex to fit the "faction or new party" dilemma were ignored. No attention was paid to Ivan Kalchev, who noted a global trend toward the withering away of the parties in their present shape. Equally convincing was the statement by Ivan Krustev that today we have in our country more parties than ideas and that it would be more natural, with a view to the forthcoming elections, to seek ideological allies not based on party features. Asen Zhablenski, representative of the coordination council of the "Path to Europe" platform also seemed to have sensed a certain intolerance on the part of the audience. He suggested the immediate unification of the reformist wing within the party, not only on the basis of a common ideological platform but also a common organizational structure. He also called for the establishment of contact groups for purposes of dialogue and reciprocal acquaintanceship with anyone who is ready in the forthcoming elections to support the common objective: having a maximal number of reformers and democrats in parliament.

Actually, the unification of the left wing within the BCP is, in a certain sense, with us. This was confirmed by the Plovdiv representatives and by the club of radical delegates to the 14th extraordinary congress, which was set up in the course of the conference. The question, however, is whether this fragile unity will not be dominated by reciprocal suspicions, personal ambitions, impatient reformism or explosive manifestation of emotions. These are all things which could undermine the nonetheless established agreement to the effect that both the faction and the new alternative party have their own place and historical justification under contemporary

conditions and that their strengthening and efficient existence is possible only on the basis of reciprocal support and cooperation.

We cannot speak of success or failure as we go back to the results of the Second National Conference of the ASO. This conference also became the first act in the birth of a new party. However, the separation of the ranks could be only organizational and not ideological or in terms of joint future practical work. This was proclaimed by both sides but will it take place? Will there be a fast "revolution" or a faster "evolution" within the BCP, a total separation or common responsibility for the past and the future of a 100-year old party? Everyone has the right to his personal choice and all of us together, within a faction or a new party, share responsibility for the condition and state of our society today and tomorrow.

If a division becomes inevitable, the constructive presence in the particularly difficult political situation of our country is the only alternative for anyone who, however different his ideas may be, does not oppose the implementation of the proclaimed BCP objectives.

HUNGARY

Nemeth, Zoltan Kiraly Lead Presidential Popularity Poll

25000686A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
13 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by Eva Gabossy: "Gallup Polls: Statistical Battle Between MDF and SZDSZ—Who Should Be the President of the Republic?"]

[Text] More than half of the eligible Hungarian voters are certain about casting a vote. This represents great progress because, according to a Gallup Public Opinion and Market Research, Limited statement made at a Kossuth Club press conference yesterday, November's Gallup polls showed that 40 percent of citizens were unaware of any party.

The assessment was made on the basis of a 1,000-person sample, representative of the country's population. Of the voters who have already made up their minds about taking part in the elections, 23.1 percent would vote for the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], while 21.5 percent plan to vote for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. With 17 percent of the vote the Smallholders Party [FKgP] is third in the representative contest, while the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is fourth, with 8.7 percent of the vote. With 3.8 percent of the vote, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] trails last. Two parties may present surprises according to Gallup researchers. These are the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP].

Twelve percent of the citizens interviewed said that they will not, or that they probably will not, take part in the elections.

The results turned out differently when public opinion researchers inquired about how close people feel to the various parties. In February, 21.2 percent of the people felt close to the MDF, 20.6 percent to the SZDSZ, 16 percent to the FKgP, 9.3 percent to FIDESZ, and 7.5 percent to the MSZP. The Gallup inquiry is also stratified on the basis of the place of residence and educational level. The SZDSZ will receive its greatest support from residents of Budapest and from people with higher education. Irrespective of educational level, the MDF finds its greatest support in large cities. In contrast, the FKgP may count on the largest number of votes in the countryside and among people who have not even completed their eighth grade education. The MSZP will tend to win the votes of urbanites with higher level qualifications.

Respondents were also asked about the future president of the republic during the survey. Miklos Nemeth would win the votes of 24.6 percent of the people, while Zoltan Kiraly would take 22.8 percent. Matyas Szuros would receive 12.3 percent of the vote. These assessments reveal that persons belonging to the MSZP enjoy a significant advantage insofar as familiarity with politicians is concerned.

Postelection Constitutional Process Subject of Dispute

Uncertainty Surrounds Key Issues

25000694B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
30 Mar 90 p 7

[Interview with Peter Schmidt, constitutional law professor, by Tibor J. Keri; place and date not given: "Public Law Crisis?"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The second round of elections will be held on 8 April. When are we going to have a functioning parliament, a government, and an elected president of the republic? In general: How will the government come into being? Who will elect the president of the republic? We asked constitutional law professor Peter Schmidt about these matters.

[Schmidt] The constitution provides that Parliament must be convened within 30 days after the elections. Obviously, this should be understood to mean the second round of elections. The first task at the organizational meeting is the election of officers: the president of the National Assembly, and its vice presidents and recorders. The various committees must also be established. Since the Presidential Council no longer exists, the authority of the head of state is exercised by the president of the republic. But since neither the people nor the National Assembly have elected anyone to this

post, that office will be filled temporarily by the president of Parliament. Quite naturally, his commission will last until the new president of the new National Assembly is elected.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The president of the National Assembly automatically becomes provisional president of the republic....

[Schmidt] Yes, and his authority as president of the National Assembly will also be exercised—temporarily—by one of the vice presidents. The provisional president of the republic will assign the task of forming a government to one of the representatives. But in reality he can do so only if he has achieved an appropriate consensus with the parties.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is there any legal provision which sets a time limit for the establishment of the new government?

[Schmidt] There is no such requirement in the constitution. I believe, however, that forming a government as soon as possible constitutes a political power interest. Although this depends on the parties and on agreements, the matter may be resolved within an hour, or the bargaining may be prolonged for a long time.

[NEPSZABADSAG] We are aware of the present election results. The difference between the two largest parties amounts to only a few percentage points. The provisional president must ask a representative from the largest party to form a government.

[Schmidt] That is not true. He may designate anyone to perform this task. An example for this exists in Italy, where Bettino Craxi, the leader of a small party was able to form a government, but only with the support of a parliamentary majority. This may also occur in Hungary, although there is only a very small likelihood of this happening.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Once we have a government, how will we have a president of the republic?

[Schmidt] That is the question to which I am unable to provide an answer that is correct from a political standpoint and from the standpoint of public law. At one time a strong president of the republic was desired for the transition period. During the roundtable negotiations the parties took the position that Parliament should elect the president of the republic in the spirit of Law No. 1 of 1946. The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] appropriately objected to this, and complained about the idea that the president of the republic would be elected prior to the general elections. This is why they initiated the popular referendum which produced the well-known result. Certain political forces turned this matter around against the SZDSZ by claiming that the SZDSZ did not want the people to elect a president. In turn, the SZDSZ announced that this was not at all at issue; what they wanted was for the people to always have the right to elect a president, and for this reason they would be

willing to support a change in the constitution. As a curious feature of this matter, however, in the end it was not the SZDSZ which presented the proposal to Parliament. Representative Zoltan Kiraly did. Considering the political situation which existed at the time, the National Assembly did not dare to say "no" to this proposal. That is why they changed the constitution, and that is why the president of the republic will not be elected by the National Assembly, but by the people. This solution fully contradicts the entire concept of the parliamentary system, in which the executive power is composed of the president of the republic and of a government that is responsible to Parliament.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What could we do? After all, the constitution would have to be changed once again.

[Schmidt] Another election would not be tolerable, in my view. The campaign has already burdened the people with many contradictions, internal conflicts, and struggles. By now we should be able to relax, and it would be appropriate to seek common denominators rather than sharpening new conflicts. For this reason I am convinced that the new Parliament will change the constitution, and will enact a law that the president should be elected by the National Assembly.

[NEPSZABADSAG] But the approval of a constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority....

[Schmidt] This will be the greatest concern confronting the new Parliament. This is because even a government supported by a 60-percent majority will need opposition votes. And this will be true not only with regard to amending the constitution, but also with regard to the passage of any law having the force of the constitution. The law concerning the tax on mortgage interest is a good example. The Constitutional Court supported its decision by saying that the law was not enacted on the basis of a two-thirds majority vote. But think of this: Could it be that the day after tomorrow the government will not be able to levy taxes unless the idea is supported by a two-thirds majority? Will there be a government which can be assured of that? Only a grand coalition could provide that; on the other hand, I do not know whether such a coalition can be achieved in Hungary. If this is so, sooner or later we must be prepared to face a public law crisis....

Executive Selection, Succession an Issue

25000694B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
31 Mar 90 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Laszlo Szuk, Justice Ministry expert, by Lajos Bodnar; place and date not given: "'Temporary' Public Law Dilemma; How Long Does the Mandate of the President of the Republic Last?"—first three paragraphs are NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The approaching second round of elections raises a series of exciting public law issues. Of these, the one

that is perhaps of greatest caliber is the duration of the mandate of the provisional president of the republic.

According to generally held views, the mandate essentially expires with the ceremonial opening of the new Parliament. This is what constitutional lawyer Peter Schmidt said in an article published in yesterday's issue of this newspaper. According to his "script," Parliament elects its president of the National Assembly, who then automatically becomes provisional president of the republic. "His authority as president of the National Assembly will be exercised—also temporarily—by one of the vice presidents. The provisional president of the republic will assign the task of forming a government to one of the representatives."

This is a clear formula, but we asked Justice Ministry expert Dr. Laszlo Szuk where we could find a legal basis for this. His response came as a surprise to us.

"I thoroughly checked this issue after reading the statement. I must say that there is no specific rule governing this matter. This is a kind of interpretation. And it is an erroneous interpretation," the expert underscored, and then added: "I also consulted with constitutional lawyer Dr. Istvan Kukorelli on this issue. He is of the opinion that the Constitutional Court must render a decision in this matter. In my view, we cannot have as our goal the exchange of a provisional president of the republic for another provisional president of the republic."

Accordingly, pursuant to this separate opinion, we should await the direct election of the president, consistent with the constitution. Otherwise, in a real public law crisis situation, following the possible dissolution of Parliament, new "provisional" presidents would have to be chosen repeatedly, whereas the function of the president would be to establish stability and the smooth settlement of crises.

In any event, parties preparing themselves to enter Parliament are planning for the change in the presidency based on a different script. The Constitutional Court should render an opinion as soon as possible with regard to this uncertainty in public law, and should clearly terminate debate. The person who may provide a mandate to form a government after 8 April depends upon the decision of the highest forum that protects the constitution.

FIDESZ on Ballot Form, Soviet Troops, Pozsgay, SZDSZ

*25000686C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
14 Mar 90 p 6*

[Article by Attila Gy. Fekete: "FIDESZ-SZDSZ Relationship Becoming More Difficult: 'The Russians Would Have Left on Their Own'"]

[Text] On behalf of the FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats] steering committee, Gabor Fodor has filed a protest with Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth for printing

only the full name of his organization on the ballot forms, instead of the abbreviation "FIDESZ" that was introduced during the course of the election campaign, without asking FIDESZ. At yesterday's press conference, spokesman Andras Bozoki added: Unless the Interior Ministry or the prime minister responsible for the operations of the Interior Ministry make a change in this regard prior to the elections, they will not only be accused of malice, but FIDESZ will also file a complaint with international organizations.

In viewing the parties' agreement with the government, Viktor Orban said that "the Russians would have left the territory of the country, independent of this agreement." That is, once signed, the present status of the Vienna armed forces reduction negotiations permits the stationing of 198,000 soldiers in Eastern Europe, i.e. half the size of the forces presently stationed in the region. And from the Soviet standpoint, Hungary has less strategic significance than, e.g., the German Democratic Republic or Poland. Regarding claims for indemnification by the Soviet Union, the FIDESZ leader said that we will not pay a penny!

FIDESZ confirmed that they will initiate a parliamentary review of the agreement that has just been reached, so as to accelerate the withdrawal of troops.

On other issues, Victor Orban simply charged Imre Pozsgay with being "a coward in a political sense," for not agreeing to participate in public debate. He then noted that, according to his sad experience, other parties also decline to be measured up with FIDESZ in public.

Speaking of the 15 March holiday, Tamas Deutsch criticized the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] for wanting to expropriate the holiday based on the claim that "their activists were already beaten up at the Petofi monument in the 1970's." According to Deutsch, the SZDSZ was not willing to compromise with FIDESZ in any respect in the course of negotiations; SZDSZ leaders discredited each other by rescinding promises that had been made earlier, changing their minds overnight.

Declassified Duna-Gate Report Released

*25000686B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
15 Mar 90 p 6*

[MTI report: "Duna-Gate Interior Ministry Report: Temporary Problems"]

[Text] The report of an ad hoc committee established by the Interior Minister to investigate the Duna-Gate affair has been made public. It deals with the matters contained in a complaint filed by the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]. Release of the document took place after Interior State Secretary Zoltan Gal lifted the top secret classification of the material. This took place after parts which contained state secrets, but which did not affect the content of the report, were purged.

The 14-page report states that the state security organization is burdened with heavy responsibility for not taking the most needed temporary measures that would have been indispensable for the conduct of legitimate secret service work, even though the review and revocation of internal directives, rules, and orders determining state security work has begun.

A written statement issued by the Interior Ministry leadership concerning the ad hoc committee's report states that the report evaluates the data and circumstances revealed, primarily from the standpoint of legal provisions that are now in force. It pays less attention to the process character of the events, and to the political and social changes that have accelerated to an extraordinary degree in the meantime. The personnel and management involved in the day-to-day direction of the armed service could not possess an appropriate sense of judgment to evaluate the legality of the service's actions, due to existing line relationships and stringent provisions for the protection of secrets. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that the ministry did not recognize that the problem of regulating the secret service could be used for purposes of a political attack. The Interior Ministry leadership is of the opinion that the destruction of documents took place primarily for the purpose of preventing the utilization of information contained in the documents, and so that the information would not provide an opportunity for abuse under changing political conditions. The managers involved are responsible for irregularities in the process of destroying documents. Steps have been taken to discontinue this kind of practice.

Csurka on Fear, Land Ownership, Former MSZMP Members

*25000686D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
11 Mar 90 p 4*

[Article by county reporter K. E. P.: "History Has Pronounced Judgment—Csurka Invokes Bocskai"]

[Text] "We have won already, not in the sense that we have acquired a sufficient number of votes, but in the sense that the turnaround in support of which the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] unfurled its banner is an irreversible accomplishment. A multitude of decent and untainted people have had the opportunity to become involved in politics, to state and to formulate a better future for 16 million Hungarians. And yet, despite free speech, fear still exists in people. Why?" Istvan Csurka, who heads the MDF Bekes County slate of candidates, asked this at a grand rally held in Bekescsaba yesterday morning. He instantly responded to the question.

"People are afraid because no one has clearly stated that there is nothing to be afraid of. Communism has failed. This is fact, and it is a fact that we have not caused, but over which history has pronounced a verdict. This is why there is no force, and there can be no force, even in Moscow, to reverse this process."

To support his finding, the member of the MDF national presidium proved in his analysis that the Soviet Union has lost the armament race, and thus is unable to do anything but surrender its previous expansionist policies and the territories it acquired with the help of arms. Accordingly, any opposition politician who claims that he will send the Soviet troops home from this country and will chase away the communists creates fear in people, because those chased away could return just as they did in 1956, unless all of this has taken place under pressure exerted by history.

By invoking the name of Istvan Bocskai, Csurka advised that all matters must be viewed as they exist. We must grasp the essence of the system we have left behind, and we must fight that essence.

It is the MDF's goal now, at last, in cooperation with its coalition partners, to start the Hungarian people on the right path for the first time in history. From among the coalition partners, Csurka dealt at greatest length with the Smallholders [FKgP]. He demonstrated the many similarities between the two party programs. On the other hand, Csurka regarded the restoration of 1947 land ownership conditions that has been proclaimed and demanded by the Smallholders as a demand that cannot be fulfilled. He also disagreed with the proclamation of "clean parties, free of communists."

"Where are we going to put 800,000 people? Are they all guilty?" the orator asked. One cannot battle 800,000 former party members, especially not the simple, mislead Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] members held far away from decisionmaking and condemned to implementation only, who were driven into the party by fate. He also cautioned against stigmatizing the former party members' families and children. We must make an opening, otherwise there will be no democracy here, just as there will be no democracy without a strong middle class. It is the important task of the MDF to strengthen and to return the footing for this middle class, Csurka said, and then concluded by saying that a staid attitude, sober consideration, and a realistic program are needed now, because irresponsible promises support the claims of the opponents of the future victors, and as a result the new government will be faced with insurrections and strikes from the very beginning.

POLAND

Doubts Surrounding Changes in Ministry of Internal Affairs Viewed

*90EP0408A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC
in Polish No 7 16 Feb 90 p 1, 16*

[Article by Ewa Wilk: "Department: After the Rout of Many Structures of the Totalitarian Government, Its Structural Pillar Remained Intact on the Battlefield"]

[Text] At the end of January, reports began to arrive from various parts of the country concerning the destruction of archives of the Security Service. A pretext was finally found to insert into the tight timetable a set of three plans for statutes pertaining to the Department of Internal Affairs, signed by 15 deputies in the Citizens Parliamentary Club (OKP). On 5 February, the government worked late into the night on the rival, most imperfect packet of statutes written by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW).

Several weeks earlier, we saw on television the spectacular confrontations with the political police in certain bloc countries.

Is an impassioned crowd that destroys the Security headquarters capable of tearing the hydra's head off? Certainly not. But while at the outset, the problem of the security forces appeared among our neighbors, we had to be content with the premier's assurance, contained in the January speech in the Sejm, that he himself will see to the early solution of the problem. At the same time, the MSW gladly put forth its own plans for statutes concerning them, with the assurance that it had spontaneously undergone a curative evolution.

The answer to the question as to the delay of reforms in this department only appears to be simple. Every child in this country knows who issued the invitations to the round table. The confidence which both the premier and the president placed in General Kiszczak had to serve for a certain time as a guarantee that the Security organization would not be used for political revolution. Even last August, when the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki was being formed, the Solidarity faction announced its "desinteressement" with respect to the department, accepting the evolutionary changes within it. However, when the Peoples' Autumn spread over Eastern Europe, it became obvious that evolution must be hurried along. Pretending that there were changes in the department was not only groundless, but actually dangerous.

With this conviction, the deputies began to work on plans for the new security statutes. However, they themselves admit that what they finally came up with may be a temporary statute, a transitional statute, an evolutionary step. These plans probably will not cause panic in the department since their outline (as the plans developed by the Krakow specialists grouped around Solidarity may be regarded) was admitted to be significantly less courageous than the proposals themselves. The other side was not remiss in the exchange of compliments, and expressed the belief that the MSW plan should be forgotten altogether.

The Force of Evil

If the Sejm bases its statutes exclusively on deputy plans, this in itself would indicate that the Department of Internal Affairs will be treated with white gloves. It is well known, after all, that neither in its structure, nor its powers, nor its position in the system of institutions of a totalitarian state, did the MSW differ substantially from

similar organizations in East Germany, China or Romania. That it was not used in the same way as in China or Romania was due only to the fact that the people gave it no pretext, were not moved to desperation, did not want a revolution. It is another matter that in recent years persons who were ready to send tanks against the crowd have left the responsible posts in the MSW. As Deputy Jan M. Rokita says, those persons would have had a greater predilection toward applying the Romanian model. We would have had very little opportunity for evolutionary changes if General Kiszczak's post were occupied by General Milewski, for example.

This happy coincidence of personnel circumstances must not, however, hide the actual position of the Security organization. It would be naive in this case to believe that the police law stipulating what an officer may or may not do had some specific significance. In a totalitarian state, the essence of the police is that they put themselves above any law. Moreover, even in the most democratic states, breaking the law is quite common. The source of police power rests in its internal structure and in its being built into the state system in such a way that, penetrating the state's institutions, it eludes all supervision. This system, organized according to a military pattern, is supplemented by strictly military units.

Access to information about the internal organization of the MSW was thus far effectively blocked by a network of regulations on state and military secrecy. Obvious only was the fact that complete power over both the political police and the ordinary police was concentrated in the hands of the department chief. The Citizens Militia (MO) was wholly absorbed and dominated by the Security Service (SB). Today, the ordinary policeman will tell the truth that SB made up the upper stories of the government building, and one entered there only in the course of duty and always with fear, but we also know that this ordinary policeman might at any moment have been used in actions against the people that interested the political police. SB domination is manifested in that today the SB itself handles all the more important criminal matters (murders, bribery, etc.).

These Siamese twins, unequivocally connected with party hegemony, would not have their power without a prosecutor's office empowered to watch over the whole system of so-called socialist law and order, a prosecutor's office wholly removed from anyone's supervision and penetrated by the security forces. It is just this structure that creates the framework of a state within the state.

A Conjecture: a Sheriff

The first step toward breaking up this complex has already been taken: the prosecutor's office has been subordinated to the government. Other steps may be the functionaries' giving up the right to belong to a political party and an institutional separation of the SB (the future Office of State Protection) from the MO (the future State Police) and submitting both to various

forms of supervision. The main concern is to extend the authority of the president of the Council of Ministers and of the whole government with respect to the security forces, to make certain decisions dependent on agreement with the trade unions of the functionaries, and finally, to provide for supervision of police activities by local regional governments. A people's council attached to the minister might constitute a certain element of supervision, although with its exclusively advisory capacity, we should have no illusions that this would be an effective instrument.

This process could be crowned by dividing the police into various groups of specialists. Its core, or the group that would be closest to the citizen, guarding his peace and safety, would ultimately be left as an element of the self-government system. To state the matter as briefly as possible: We would appropriate the sheriff model into our system.

These structural changes would be accompanied simultaneously by changes in police law. The matter is not simple since a compromise must be found between effectiveness of the police and preservation of human rights. Fortunately, we do not have to grope to find our way since modern legislation has worked out a whole system of safeguards that depends on the police officer applying any drastic measures as a last resort, and, on the other hand, the citizen bringing the police officer before an independent court. One of the plans of the deputies makes a quite sound proposal for something of this kind.

The real nut that must be cracked, however, is the police structure. We must state clearly that the prospect of a "sheriff" is, at the moment, foggy, and we do not really know what our goal is. It seems that the heart prompts decentralizing the police, but what the police will become, we actually do not know. In countries where police are decentralized (United States, Great Britain), the whole ramified system was formed if not over ages, then over decades and grew out of local tradition. We have no traditions to which it would be worthwhile to return; we really don't. While others built a system of citizen protection in sovereignty, we were stuck in terror of the invaders. The Second Republic left us solutions which confirm that the authoritarian fascinations that overwhelmed Europe in the 1930's did not bypass Poland either. Even if platoon leaders and sergeants are inevitably replaced by policemen and police inspectors, this, unfortunately, would be the only one of the few elements of tradition that would be worth taking up.

Theoretically, together with elections to local administrations, we will jump into such deep water as to include "Polish sheriffs" with the idea that the people themselves will figure out what to do with this dilemma. The general opinion is that the majority of local administrations would not be able to handle this load financially.

Security Force Clients

All of these questions now lie in the shadow of the question: What should the Office of State Protection

(UOP) be? Logic suggests that the question is more general: do we really need political police? Yet we cannot deny reason to those who believe that the erstwhile Security system was a law-breaking organization and who would be ready, consequently, to mete out punishment for the very fact of belonging to the system, instead of moving a set of functionaries who are rated as excellent professionals to the police force and entrusting others with tasks of protecting democracy, all manifestations of which they quite conscientiously stopped fighting.

Those in the MSW itself have the fewest problems with justifying the use of the UOP. Lieutenant-Colonel Wojciech Garstka, the minister's spokesman, weaves an apocalyptic vision of how, together with capitalism, the international mafia will want to ensnare our country, and of the field we will create for saboteurs, terrorists, and so on. The matter of intelligence and counterintelligence, Lt Col Garstka places beyond discussion: These exist all over the world. In the face of such menace, equipping the political police with special powers seems obvious.

Deputy Rokita's evaluations of the dimensions of the menace of spying, terrorism or sabotage is completely opposite. He believes that today, the political police would have two or three clients. Besides, there would not be the least justification to give them special powers, and especially not special authority. Consequently, the UOP should be an ordinary police force whose purpose would be to prevent and prosecute a specific group of crimes.

Although the department agrees theoretically to an institutional separation of the UOP from the police, it would willingly maintain at least one umbilical cord. This pertains to a single logistic base. Putting forward the deceptive argument of economy, the political police would allow itself access in the future to all operational technology. The same people (with perhaps only the legitimization changed) would keep the voluminous records, means of communication, surveillance sections, and so on.

This seemingly technical detail reveals the intentions of the current Security organization and suggests the question: To what extent would the method of evolutionary, institutional changes be capable of breaking up the power of this organization? Are not the chances somewhat high that the entrenched people in entrenched structures and responsibilities will slip through?

Awaiting Frustration

We all feel intuitively that the department will not give up easily, that all the changes made thus far are superficial or forced since there was no way to resist them. The first categories include changes in department signs and legitimization. On the door of the chief of the SB investigative department there suddenly appears a sign with the laconic inscription, "Chief." This same person in this same office in the same headquarters of the Voivodship Office of Internal Affairs (WUSW) continues to carry

out the same tasks. The spokesperson of the minister announces that this person's legitimation has also been changed. In its legitimizing fervor, the MSW has gone so far that rumor has it that SB functionaries constitute scarcely 4 percent of the total number employed.

The category of forced changes includes at least the history of the quite painful birth of the NSZZ functionaries, and an attempt was made at once to channel this initiative into the arranged and controlled movement of functionary councils.

The department warns against excessively hasty reorganizations. Lt Col Garstka asks rhetorically: "Can you imagine what a threat to democracy those thousands of frustrated, fired functionaries who believed they were wronged would be?" The department complains that public opinion against it is generated with a purpose; it complains of hardships; it complains that it can count only on negative selection of the police profession.

And it is difficult for the department to admit the reason for the widening gulf between it and the people. Deputy Rokita has no illusions that, as if with a magician's wand, the new statutes will change the erstwhile aversion to and simple fear of a blue uniform into impetuous love and trust. He says that what is needed is a psychological change in the people.

Thus, we have the whole picture of the current Polish situation with its dramatics and eccentricity. The Sejm, brought forth on the basis of a contract whose importance is being extinguished, is trying to honor the agreement in which an understanding was reached on an evolution of Polish change. The partially democratic Parliament postulates partially good solutions. Those who have the least reason to love the police cry: We must control ourselves. No one has illusions: The people will not soon begin to trust the police, and the police will not soon begin to act with a sense of acceptance.

The people are being asked to try to like for a while longer the official alias of the chief and to trust that no frustration born of sudden impulse will bring the anaesthetized force against us.

YUGOSLAVIA

Slovene Weekly Interviews Kosovo Serb Activist

90EB0299A Ljubljana TELEX in Slovene 8 Feb 90
pp 19-21

[Interview with Ljubo Vujovic, Pristina JEDINSTVO journalist, by Zarko Rajkovic, place and date not given: "The Man Who Told Drnovsek He Was a Traitor"]

[Text] Ljubo Vujovic, a JEDINSTVO journalist, comes from Hercegovina, but his ancestors moved to Kosovo Polje a long time ago. Even in the past he was a permanent member of Kosovo Polje delegations speaking with politicians. A few days ago, he headed the delegation that left for Belgrade, during the most serious

unrest in Kosovo, for talks with Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Janez Drnovsek. Kosovo Polje residents thus met the President of the Yugoslav Presidency face to face for the first time.

[TELEX] How did it happen that you went to speak with President Drnovsek?

[Vujovic] At a certain meeting in Kosovo Polje, someone proposed that we go to the president in person just to see whether he was even aware of how serious the situation in Kosovo was. It had not occurred to us that at those critical moments the state Presidency could keep silent and not even say that it would soon discuss the situation. Armed clashes with Serbs and Montenegrins could have broken out at any moment. We therefore decided that we would go immediately and tell him that Kosovo was a powder keg and that the fuse had already been lit.

[TELEX] How did the conversation start?

[Vujovic] First he spoke to us. He said that it was good that we had come, so that they could get first-hand information about the situation in Kosovo, because he perhaps did not know all the details. As the head of the delegation, I answered that upon entering the building where the SFRY Presidency worked, I had thought that we would first be asked how we from Kosovo had even gotten past all those barricades that were on the roads at that time. Then I gave the president a description of the situation in Kosovo, and explained to him in detail everything that had happened in the province in the past few days. I emphasized that the situation was now much more serious than it had been 11 months ago, when our Kosovo Polje delegation visited Raif Dizdarevic, after which the emergency measures were introduced. We also expressed our surprise that the state Presidency was so late in responding with its report, only after a few days. To us in Kosovo, that meant betrayal by the state. I told him, "You have also betrayed Yugoslavia, Mr. President. And perhaps you also did the same thing when you cut short your visit to America in order to come to Cankar House for the adoption of the Slovene amendments."

[TELEX] How did the president answer you?

[Vujovic] Then he said that we had not met in order to talk about that now. He was not exactly pleased, but I nevertheless told him that everything that had happened at Cankar House was one of the key causes of the current unrest in Kosovo, and that the new demonstrations in Kosovo were only a consequence of it. Then we returned to the subject of the Kosovo events. He asked us what sort of measures, in our opinion, should be undertaken by the SFRY Presidency. Although we from Kosovo Polje had already said it hundreds and hundreds of times, we repeated that above all, the state and public security authorities should do their jobs and find the leaders of the counterrevolution, and then put them behind bars. Then we demanded adherence to all the measures prescribed for a state of emergency. We demanded that a law-governed state finally begin to function in Kosovo as well, and that all the Albanian emigrants be driven out of

Kosovo. Then he asked whether there was a possibility of initiating a dialogue with the leaders of the Albanians whom we called nationalists. We decisively told him, "No, there can be no such dialogue!" How can there be a dialogue with them, when their goal is to establish a republic of Kosovo, and then a Greater Albania as well? There can be no dialogue, compromise, yielding, or hesitation with such people. We are not prepared for any talks that would lead to the destruction and collapse of Yugoslavia.

[TELEX] Who else spoke on behalf of your delegation?

[Vujovic] Almost everyone. Rosa Labus asked President Drnovsek to jail us all at once, because we would have more freedom here in jail than in Kosovo. Rosa spoke very emotionally. It is not surprising, in view of the suffering she has endured. At one time she told the president that she would come to the Presidency with a pistol in her hands if just a hair on the head of her son in Kosovo were touched, and if the separatists did anything to him. The president actually trembled at these words. Then she told him that she was surprised that so far he had not personally addressed the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, whereas Nadiri Vllasi had immediately responded to her letter. Blagoje Rolovic quite openly expressed doubt as to whether President Drnovsek had even been in favor of the delayed publication of the report that had been issued by the SFRY Presidency the evening before we came to Belgrade. The president kept silent in response to all of this, and then said that he would keep in mind everything that we had said. He said that our words contained a lot of insults, which perhaps had to be understood, in light of the conditions in which we were living in Kosovo. He explained that the Presidency was working constantly and trying to find ways out of that complex situation; it was trying to find a solution for both sides. Then he told us that Slovenia did not support the separatists and that the Slovenes did not know the real truth about Kosovo, because it was being reported in different ways in Slovenia. In spite of everything, the distance of a thousand kilometers between Kosovo and Slovenia is not small. People in Slovenia are reacting to the repression, and that is the reason for such differences in views on the Kosovo situation. At the end of the conversation, the president even asked me how many Albanians, in my opinion, had been indoctrinated. I explained to him that I was not the person who could tell him the exact number, and that no one could, since even among the Albanians there were people who would like to live in peace in Kosovo, but were afraid of retaliation from the separatists, who also persecute Albanians just like us Serbs. Then I gave him the example of the Brake Factory. On orders from the Kosovo Polje LC District Committee, I was among those charged with completing the ideological and political differentiation at that factory. During the discussion, one Albanian got up and said that all the Albanians had participated in the demonstrations and the work stoppages. One hundred percent! In spite of that, I do not believe that that Albanian spoke the truth, although he was happy that he had intimidated the others and they did not say what

they really thought and wanted. I do not know what lesson the president learned from this example.

[TELEX] How did the conversation end?

[Vujovic] We do not know whether he was satisfied with that conversation; we, essentially, were not. We went to see him in order to hear from him the answers to our complaints, but he asked us more questions than we asked him. He did not even tell us that the SFRY Presidency would do everything necessary to improve the political and security situation in Kosovo. When we returned to Kosovo Polje, people were waiting for us like the sun in winter, just to hear what we had talked about with President Drnovsek. We could not tell them very much either about what would be done to stop the emigration, or when arrangements would start for the return of the Serbs and Montenegrins who had emigrated under pressure, or when conditions would be established for more peaceful life in Kosovo, based on the principles of mutual respect, just so that we could live in Kosovo. That is our fate, and we cannot avoid it. The conversation ended with his promises that all measures leading to stabilization in the province would be undertaken. At the end, we asked him once more to understand that the situation in Kosovo was extremely serious, and to keep us from becoming live targets for bullets from Albanian separatists. He promised us that he would come to Kosovo, and did so in a few days.

[TELEX] How did the conversation with Slobodan Milosevic go?

[Vujovic] We knew that Milosevic was more familiar with events in Kosovo, but we decided even so to go and visit him as well. We would have gone to see the devil himself if only he could have helped us. We asked him whether he knew that last year 1,700 Serbs and Montenegrins had moved out of Kosovo. That is 1 percent of all of us who are still living in Kosovo. If the emigration continues at the same rate, there will not be a single Serb or Montenegrin left in Kosovo. That estimate is not correct either, since the percentage of those emigrating will increase every year, if we do not prevent this. People simply see that everyone around them is fleeing, and so they move away as well. It is thus possible that there will be an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo in 5 years. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences of this for Yugoslavia. It simply means that Yugoslavia will no longer exist. Milosevic answered that he knew all those facts, and that Serbia would never permit it. Then we consulted with Milosevic on whether it was necessary to evacuate the children. He told us that this was a very difficult question, and that we ourselves should judge whether this was necessary on a case-by-case basis. We spoke with him for a little more than two hours, and the conversation gave us encouragement in our efforts to defend and protect our right to live freely in the province. We hope that Milosevic will keep his word. I do not even dare to think what would happen if he also turned his back on us.

[TELEX] These days, however, the situation is better than it was 10 days ago. Does that mean that the promises you received in Belgrade are being fulfilled?

[Vujovic] It is too early for such assessments. Above all, the situation in Kosovo and Metohija is only apparently more peaceful. It is only a clever new tactic of the Albanian separatists. Some of us estimate that about 2,000 women and children have temporarily left Kosovo in the last few days. I am emphasizing the word "temporarily"; let me explain, however, what that really means. In the past, women and children have also moved away temporarily, every time that the Albanian separatists were running wild. Then the situation apparently becomes calmer, and then the women and children return to their homes, but never all of them. Through Kosovars who have already emigrated, friends, neighbors, and so forth, those women make new acquaintances, and find jobs for themselves or their husbands, and so the temporary relocation turns into a permanent one. That will undoubtedly happen now as well. People's nerves are shot, they want peace, and they have had enough of fear. You will see that at least 300 members of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples will not return to their homes in Kosovo after this latest migration. That means that the Albanian separatists have achieved their goal. They have reduced the number of us Serbs by at least 300, and in a month or two, when they begin to run wild again, they will reduce it by another 300 or more, and so on. To be sure, they have been doing that for many years now. One would have to be blind not to see this, or not be able to see this.

[TELEX] Are you alluding to the reporting by Slovene journalists?

[Vujovic] I do not have anything to allude to or conceal; I just want to say what I see. A year ago, I was with about 15 Slovene journalists in a restaurant owned by my brother. We talked about all sorts of things, but mostly about Kosovo, of course. I could not understand at all why they had such a mistaken idea about what was really happening in Kosovo. That is absolutely unbelievable to me. You would not believe what sort of prejudices they came with! In their opinion, we Serbs are oppressing the poor Albanians in Kosovo. So I challenged all 15 or 20 of them, however many there were, to find me just one single example of that, and I would offer them thousands of proofs that the Albanians had oppressed the Serbs. They looked at each other, but none of them cited even one such example. They could not even cite one, you understand? After all that, how can I think anything else but that everything happening in Kosovo is being orchestrated by remote control from Slovenia? And so that tragic situation is occurring in Kosovo.

[TELEX] Aren't there a lot of exaggerations in the Belgrade press as well, especially in POLITIKA?

[Vujovic] I am against any exaggeration, and it must be clear that such divisions do not lead anywhere. POLITIKA is another matter; even if it exaggerates in some

articles, the facts are nevertheless on its side. Although it may possibly grow into some other big games, the facts are still inescapable: it is clear who the victims of terror in Kosovo are.

[TELEX] The alternative movements in Kosovo are demanding a dialogue. Isn't a dialogue the right way to achieve stabilization of the situation in Kosovo?

[Vujovic] Of course, a dialogue is reasonable. But tell me—a dialogue with whom? With Rugova? With what kind of alternative movement, when they are all 100 percent of one nationality, 100 percent exclusively Albanian? And then they even cynically call such a movement democratic. Just think about it. Let us say that we in Kosovo Polje now establish some sort of democratic alliance or party of our own—it doesn't matter what. We would write in its program that we are for democracy, for good interethnic relations, for human rights and freedoms, and so forth, everything as beautiful as can be. And what would happen then? Nothing. We Serbs and Montenegrins would join the new party, but not one Albanian! The interethnic division here is already so bad that one can hardly eradicate it overnight. The worst thing of all is that young Albanians are so poisoned with hatred that it is absolutely incomprehensible. That is passed on from generation to generation. If those Kosovo alternative activists are so influential, why haven't they already gathered their strength and stated that demonstrations have to be absolutely peaceful, that one should not shoot at those Albanian youths, but that it is also necessary to safeguard the life of every young man in uniform who has come to Kosovo to protect his country. That has not even occurred to them. They are suited by violence, and then a presumed pacification of the situation is postponed indefinitely—although actually not indefinitely, since they know that if things continue as they are, Kosovo will be left without a single Serb. Of course, I am also sorry for those young people who died, but I wonder who is responsible for that. In my opinion, those who are most guilty are their elders. I would not let my child go into the street where shooting was going on. Why have the Albanian demonstrators been mostly boys? At 15-16 years of age, they are probably not so "aware" that their own personal convictions motivate them to go out into the street and die with the words "a Kosovo republic" on their lips. Who taught them that, if not their elders? There are thousands of other apparently secondary but also important questions, such as the general lack of education, primitivism, and above all, the patriarchal system in Kosovo. In every Albanian home today young people, on the threshold of a new century, still have to listen to their elders. None of those young people has the right to live independently, to his own opinion, to choose to be what he wants to be. Everything is decided strictly according to plan, and young generations of Albanians still remain blind prisoners of tradition. In such a situation, they can be given orders like "Go, and if necessary, die as well, because if you do not go to the demonstrations, you know what is waiting for you at home." Every one of them knows what

is waiting for him: some sort of slave labor within those walls that Albanians have around their houses. All of these are very important elements if we want to see Kosovo as it is today.

[TELEX] How can that picture be finally improved?

[Vujovic] Simply by having our government finally begin to act like every other civilized government in the world, and protect its citizens against violence.

MLADINA on Vuk Draskovic, His Party

90EB0297A Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 2 Feb 90
pp 22-23

[Article by Svetlana Vasovic: "The Leopard Changes Its Spots"]

[Text] Serbian National Renewal [SNO] is the first party in Yugoslavia that is already operating illegally. After the Sava Society was renamed Serbian National Renewal, it was banned on 12 January.

On 25 January Radmilo Bogdanovic, Serbian Republic Secretary of Internal Affairs, confirmed that the ban did not apply only to the Sava Society, but also to the renamed party. In response to a question from an assembly delegate about what the police would do about the announcement of the establishment of the new party, he stated that there was no reason to doubt that the Serbian police would do everything necessary to block its founding meeting. It thus became clear that the police would take action even though the ban on the Sava Society issued by the Ruma Internal Affairs Secretariat did not cite the new name, Serbian National Renewal.

Without support from the Serbian press and political leadership, the new party had to seek a safe but honest solution for its awkward position. Its founding had been scheduled for 27 January, and on that day, when Serbs could publicly celebrate the memory of Saint Sava for the first time in more than 40 years, the party was to see the light of day. Its problems had only begun. All its requests for the rental of a hall in Belgrade were decisively rejected. The decree was obeyed everywhere, and thus, according to Vuk Draskovic, it was not possible to find suitable spaces anywhere, even in schools, handicraft cooperatives, or movie theaters, within 50 kilometers of Belgrade. Although the SNO's members understood the warning from Republic Internal Affairs Secretary Radmilo Bogdanovic as an announcement of future arrests, they nevertheless were thinking about two possible outcomes. They could hold their founding meeting in Republic Square in Belgrade, in the presence of several thousand members and sympathizers, or they could also decide on a safer, conspiratorial approach.

In recent consultations at the Sunce cafe and the Serbian Writers' Club at 7 Francuzka Street, however, they decided on another possibility. Where the action would take place was, of course, hidden from the masses. Although on 27 January neither Vuk Draskovic nor his

companions appeared in front of the Synod Church or even in front of the Saint Sava Cathedral on Vracar, it was clear to cognoscenti that only more important business could have kept them away. At that time, the founding meeting began at 10 AM in a secret place in Belgrade, where Mirko Jovic was elected as the first president by a group of the most trustworthy members of the SNO. They did not even discuss the draft program, which has raised so much of an uproar, because of their conspiratorial haste. Instead, immediately after the illegal founding meeting, they left for Topola, and went to the Oplenac church, where they paid their respects to the monument to General Karadjordje and his heirs. Later, in front of the future Saint Sava church in Belgrade, they made a public statement in which they announced the great event and promised that a public founding meeting would follow soon in more favorable political circumstances. About 5 PM, as rumors had predicted, they took a walk in Republic Square.

The leaders were covertly watched from nearby cafes by about 50 admirers, who could conclude in a quiet, Socratic conversation that the party had finally been established and that they could await further guidance. Some activists, who had traveled all the way from Bosnia, Lika, and Knin in order to participate in the great event, did not conceal their disappointment that they had not taken part in the founding. "What did you decide about us Serbs from Bosnia?" was one question that could be heard in the crowd, and similar questions were also asked by travelers from other Serbian areas. Those from Belgrade stopped only briefly, said a few sentences, and walked on. "Damn Serbia—10 million inhabitants, and only 50 nationalists!" one of them stated with disappointment, and angrily walked past the illegals. In spite of the promise of arrests, the police observed the events from a safe distance, without disrupting the idyllic mood of the renewers, who were in the meantime signing a petition demanding the legalization of the party.

It was almost impossible to recognize Vuk Draskovic, however. Even before the founding meeting, one could observe, and not by chance, a certain caution in his statements. "I insist that you write down and emphasize that what I am telling you I am saying only as a completely ordinary member of the SNO. I am not the president," Draskovic stated firmly. In response to a question about whether he was perhaps emphasizing his ordinary membership out of a fear of police persecution, he only smiled: "I am emphasizing it because I am not the president of the party and I am also by no means a leader of the SNO. I do not have any political or party ambitions. As a writer who deals with the genocide against the Serbian people, I have contributed my literary and historical knowledge to the SNO program, which must be above all a call for thought." Vuk, of course, has not changed his well-known positions on possible solutions to the Serbian national question and the need to redraw Serbia's borders in connection with this.

"The Serbs are well aware that the Slovenes did not betray the homeland when they had a one-time opportunity to do so, in 1941. The Slovenes defended the kingdom with the same passion with which the Serbs defended it, and it was not by chance that Hitler imprisoned only Serbian soldiers, Slovene soldiers, Jews, and Gypsies. And now, should the Slovenes be the greatest enemies of Yugoslavia and the ones who are threatening it? The Slovene demands for a confederation are completely understandable and acceptable. The Slovenes, however, must then understand that some of the great sons of the Slovene people, like Edvard Kardelj and also Josip Broz, who was half Slovene, divided the Serbian nation and the Serbian people into several small states. The right to a confederation, which is being demanded by the Slovenes, also means that the Serbs should have the same right. If that is on the agenda, then it is also necessary to raise the question of Serbia's borders..." It seems that the issue of Slovene-Serbian relations, as Draskovic sees it, still occupies a very important place. Vuk Draskovic had a completely unique opinion about the just concluded congress of Yugoslav communists: "No one can deny the fact that in a democratic voting process, one side has clearly won, and the other has suffered a convincing defeat. Nevertheless I, as a Serb, regret that the Serbs did not propose what the Slovenes did. I would vote wholeheartedly for every Slovene proposal. I completely agree with those who claim that all of those proposals were only something that has existed in Europe for a long time now. Still, when passions are inflamed to the point of irrationalism, it is even possible to reject Prof Ljubo Bavcon's amendment, so that one can see at first glance that the majority of the delegates voted for repression, which was, of course, tragicomical. When I observed that event, I told myself that an amendment asserting that we were people and did not have tails would certainly also fail... They voted out of passion." Is it possible, then, that Slovenes are not just perfidious betrayers of the homeland?

"I do not want that kind of Yugoslavia. How am I to live in a country in which relations between Slovenia and Serbia are on the brink of war? We have to reach an agreement as people, and then each go his own way. I will not be at war with someone with whom I am living under the same roof!" That is what Vuk Draskovic told us, even before the founding meeting of the SNO. Mirko Jovic, the first SNO president, who took over from Vuk Draskovic, seems to have had a hard time continuing in the same direction as his predecessor, with his undoubtedly original ideas. Mirko Jovic, to be sure, is a former Kosovar, 30 years old, who has graduated from a higher training school, in addition to a technical railroad secondary school. Today he is an artisan who has an independent shop for working metals and plastics. He gives the impression of a person who cannot lose his job and who could easily bear the occasionally serious trials of illegal political life.

In front of a crowd of supporters, Mirko Jovic explained his attitude toward Milosevic's cold war policy as follows: "We do not have a single justifiable reason for

quarrelling with the Slovenes. The Slovenes' support for the Albanianization of Kosovo is a result of the fact that historically, their people have not been as independent as the Serbs. The Slovene people have certain obligations to the Vatican and to the Pope. For centuries, the Vatican has been involved in everything that has happened in the Balkans in recent decades [as published]. They all participate in a certain common conspiracy." The first president explained that fortunately, the new party still retained certain funds of the former Sava Society, and that it had some of the most basic operating resources. "Still, we will have to become technically organized. We will have to print membership cards and statutes, and open a new current account. The membership will be symbolic, of course, and so we will also accept voluntary contributions."

Why did a party that 14 days ago so bravely announced its public founding not arrange for a spectacle on Belgrade's streets, and thus do as much as possible for its publicity and full treasury? "We did not want a repetition here in the middle of Belgrade of what happened at a scheduled meeting in Nova Pazova, with someone sending us fighters, even fake fighters, some sort of reserve police and officers... If that happened here, it would be even worse, since there are more people here and it would be difficult to keep the situation under surveillance," Mirko Jovic stated. He hoped that the attitude of the Serbian authorities toward the SNO would change after a month. At the end of the illegal press conference in Republic Square, we also asked the first president what address the future members of the party should contact. "Naturally, we still cannot publish a permanent address and telephone number. That address is still just—Belgrade..."

[Box, p 20]

Interview With SNO President Mirko Jovic

[MLADINA] When we last met, you did not have a beard. Now you are all bearded. Why?

[Jovic] Most of us have beards, some of us for more than 20 years. As far as I personally am concerned, I never liked to shave. I only shaved regularly in the army. That is why I have a beard. Sometimes for 10 days, sometimes for 15. I always have a beard, if only in outline... Even before the establishment of the SNO we agreed that we would let our beards grow. Because of all those attacks, we will let them grow deliberately, precisely because some people are bothered by those beards.

[MLADINA] And how do you view the Cetniks?

[Jovic] You can never link us with the Cetniks. The Cetniks were the most elite Serbian army. In World War II, the Serbs did not even have Cetniks. It was an official Yugoslav army in the homeland, that fought under the Serbian flag. There were several Moslems, Croats, and Slovenes on Draza Mihailovic's staff, as there were on Josip Broz's. I am convinced that General Draza Mihailovic was a greater Yugoslav than Tito.

Leader of Serbian National Renewal Interviewed

90EB0270A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian

4 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Serbian National Renewal leader Vuk Draskovic, by Jovo Paripovic; at International Press Center in Belgrade; date not given: "Vuk Draskovic: I Would Have Talked to Tudman, But Not Negotiated With Him"; first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] One of the most controversial personalities on the domestic political scene, about whom no one is indifferent, talks about the draft program of Serbian National Renewal, about his views on the past and future of Serbia and Yugoslavia, about democracy, and about the transformations that he has undergone.

Across from me sits Vuk Draskovic, writer, but also the ideological creator of the draft program of Serbian National Renewal, which many people have said is a renewal or revival of Chetnikism. The party was founded "in a non-public place," which is, as Vuk himself says, "a clever term for a secret place." In the several apartments where it took place, there were—again, according to Draskovic's account—around 100 delegates who established the provisional executive committee. Thus far, their activities are illegal.

It is perhaps for that reason that Draskovic chose the International Press Center in Belgrade as a safe place for us to talk, or perhaps by choosing it he wanted to show how even in the center of Belgrade he is safe from threats and suppression. He says that comments on the draft program are now being received, that several of the objectives will be dropped and an assessment will be done of what the party's supporters are saying. In this regard, he mentions, for example, that another dimension of relations towards the Muslims will be specified, since many people have suggested that besides the levels of ethnic and historical truth, consideration also be given to so-called subjective feelings. I feel that perhaps this is also the starting point for our interview.

[VJESNIK] Indeed, this a priori approach of yours to the future and your offer of a decision without regard for science, history, and, ultimately, the free determination of the people can be disturbing when you invalidate the Montenegrins, Muslims, and Macedonians, or if you simply incorporate many areas into your future Serbia and designate their centers in Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Cetinja, Skopje...

[Draskovic] For example?

[VJESNIK] For example, Lika, Banija.

[Draskovic] Nowhere in our draft program have we strictly drawn borders. We insist on the principle of historical and natural justice and on the ethnic map of 6 April 1941. What right does someone have to dispute this demand if Yugoslavia is crumbling as a state, or is being organized on a confederated basis? What right does someone have to dispute this principle of ours and

take with them areas settled by a Serbian majority, or even more so by Serbian tombstones?

[VJESNIK] Why don't you allow the people there to say what they think about it?

[Draskovic] In any case, if you go to the big founding conference of Serbian National Renewal, you can make a proposal like that and listen to what the delegates from those very areas will say. We clearly know the mood of the majority of Serbs in those areas, and they are for joining the motherland.

[VJESNIK] The majority?

[Draskovic] Yes, yes, an absolute majority opinion, aside from a negligible minority who have been Quislings, from 1945 to present, with respect to the Croatian state and party organs. By what means did this Croatian state, from 1941 to present, ingratiate the Serbian people in these areas, to make you assume that they yearn to remain in Croatia?

[VJESNIK] One might ask, by what means did they not?

[Draskovic] What was done to the Serbs in Croatia from 1941 to the present has been otherwise done only to the Jews. Genocide was perpetrated, and there was unabashed emphasis on the national idea of liquidating them, or converting them to Croats.

[VJESNIK] There was Ustasha genocide perpetrated, but how can you say in such a general way "to the present"?

[Draskovic] Well, I do have to cast suspicion on the situation of postwar Croatia, which is, under different circumstances and in a different way, simply a successor to the policy of Pavelic and Artukovic. I don't have with me here my letter that I sent in 1986 to the leadership of Croatia in which I personally, as a writer, with no one backing me up, asked that the Serbs in Croatia be given back the national rights, the cultural and national institutions, that they had under Austro-Hungarian "occupation." Serbs in Croatia today recall with longing the time when they were occupied by the "ka and ka" monarchy. While the war was on, while the Serbs had to perish, they were given promises. The people have an expression: "While I entice you, I feed you sugar; once I've got you, I deny you even bread." This is exactly what happened to the Serbs during the war. If they had known where Josip Broz [Tito] would lead them, as well as those around Broz, and what sort of fate awaited them in Croatia after the war, I do not believe that they would have gone where they went. They would have gone to the other side of the forest, I believe, which today we call wrong.

[VJESNIK] Why do you think so poorly of the Serbs in Croatia, who after—according to you—40 years of oppression remain silent? Why do you not allow them to speak up about this? Why do you set aside a ghetto for them? Why in fact do you advocate that they once again be given yellow armbands?

[Draskovic] Ghetto? I'm not setting aside a ghetto for them. It's their Croatian homeland that is doing that. Croatia is not their homeland. Their Croatia can be only the Croatia about which Rade Pribicevic wrote in SRPSKA RIJEC in 1943, and that was a partisan newspaper. That type of Croatia yes, but it was never founded.

Genes Remember Fear

[VJESNIK] I asked why you do not allow the Serbs in Croatia to speak out about their situation and resolve it, instead of you writing a program for them about their future?

[Draskovic] But who has even been able to speak out in this country since 1945? Where is democracy? Where is the opportunity for free expression? Where? There isn't any! We have been led astray by the dictatorship of a minority Bolshevik party.

The genes remember fear. Man also reacts to certain forces that are beyond rational control. They simply tell him when he must stand up. And act. You see, if you throw a lamb into the water and if you beat it with a stick so that it will swim across, then if the water is not flowing fast it will set out swimming instead of suffering through the beating. However, try to throw it into a swift current. It will not start swimming. It will withstand the beating. We have simply bled to death during this century, we have lost three million or more people, primarily the biologically reproductive population, and not only because of the circumstances, but also because of this biological need for breathing space and renewal, this has led to a certain seeking of refuge in tradition, transformation, bowing heads.

[VJESNIK] For nearly 40 years I lived as a Serb in Croatia, as they called me and as you too call me; now, I have lived for more than 10 years in part of Serbia. There was a "swift current," dragging, and I swam across it. What story is it you're telling me?

[Draskovic] In any case, neither you nor I would have to talk about that any further. What is necessary is to enable the people in these areas to decide in free, secret, direct, democratic elections where they want to go, and then you will hear the response by Serbs in Croatia.

[VJESNIK] Why did you incorporate some of your hatreds from earlier into the draft program?

[Draskovic] Whose hatreds?

[VJESNIK] Yours.

[Draskovic] Mine? And where do you get the right to attribute hatred to me? If you do not substantiate them, then woe be unto you! What kind of hatreds?

[VJESNIK] You kindly call them fallacies, but what we are talking about is hatreds, such as your hatred of Josip Broz.

[Draskovic] You know what? We cannot talk from these positions. Where is there one mention of hatred here? There is a simple factual statement about what Josip Broz meant to the Serbian nation and the sort of misfortune that he brought to them. One is not recommending hatred on the part of the Serbian nation, but recognition of the fact that in this century Josip Broz was one of the greatest sources of misery and enemies of the Serbian nation. Question anything that is written about Broz!

[VJESNIK] For example, you allege that he took advantage of the presence of the occupying forces in our country and of the Ustasha genocide in order that his party and he himself could get started on taking over power. In writing this, have you not listened too much to the orders of hostile Serbian emigres?

[Draskovic] Don't label emigres as hostile towards the homeland because they are hostile towards Josip Broz. I have not met anyone who has emigrated who is an enemy of Serbia.

[VJESNIK] And Yugoslavia?

[Draskovic] Not a Yugoslavia that is structured honestly, that is not anti-Serbian and anti-civilization. Let's go back to Broz.

Uprising and Civil War

[VJESNIK] I ask you whether Broz's struggle was a struggle for power or a struggle for freedom.

[Draskovic] The first guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia and Europe was the movement of General Mihajlovic. But both Broz's and Mihajlovic's movements were Yugoslav, anti-fascist, and liberation-oriented, in the sense that the aim was to chase the occupying forces out of the country. General Mihajlovic's movement was anti-communist, while Josip Broz's was communist, and even at the outset he clearly emphasized his aim to overthrow the order of the previous state and to establish Soviet power. He established this during the war in the form of the Uzice Republic. Don't forget that on 27 June 1941, when he was living in Belgrade, when there was no notion of what was happening in the field, when there was not even one example of collaboration between Mihajlovic's people and the Germans, Broz notified Moscow to urgently start propaganda about Chetnik—or Mihajlovic's—treachery. He definitely played the card of heavenly circumstances that were to his benefit. That was chance. That terror was his chance to get his hands on power. In the end, the liberation shots of 7 July in Serbia are not fired at the occupying forces; rather, the Serbian communist fires at the Serbian Lican, the gendarme, and kills him. This means killing one's brother and killing one's class comrade...

[VJESNIK] You would prefer the other way around?

[Draskovic] We were forced to celebrate that as a day of uprising against the occupying forces. It was the first day

of the civil war. And the first shot in that civil war was fired by Josip Broz, not General Mihajlovic.

[VJESNIK] General Mihajlovic had more pressing business—collaboration.

[Draskovic] General Mihajlovic's movement was a military movement. It is true that during that unhappy civil war General Mihajlovic had very frequent contacts with the enemy. However, historians call these "tactical understandings" of a provisional nature, devised in order that the greatest possible blow be inflicted on the primary opponent in the civil war, the partisans, with the help of the occupying forces. That is not respectable. But that which is dishonorable for Mihajlovic cannot be honorable for Broz. His emissaries—and Koca Popovic, Djilas, and others are writing about this today—signed pledges stating that if there were landings by the Western Allies in the Adriatic, the partisan forces would fight the Anglo-Americans together with the Germans.

[VJESNIK] That would have been collaboration—if it had come to that.

[Draskovic] It would have in fact been collaboration if the partisans had attacked the Western Allies, but they did not even land in the Adriatic. And the agreement also did not take effect because Hitler tore it up and declared both Mihajlovic's and Broz's groups bandits, saying that both must be utterly destroyed and that he did not believe either one.

Tired of Dissension

[VJESNIK] Let's return to present-day topics. Your statement, broadcast on the news, to the effect that you would not have come to an understanding with Tudman—is it correct?

[Draskovic] No. I would have been very glad to talk with Tudman. There is no one with whom I will not talk. But I am a writer, I have no political ambitions. Because I do not have these ambitions, while Mr. Tudman does, we could not have negotiated. Especially not about borders. I think that we are not authorized to do so, neither he nor I.

[VJESNIK] As far as borders are concerned, how could these talks even be concluded, since you see Serbia as extending to the Adriatic, while Tudman sees Croatia as extending to Zemun?

[Draskovic] The Serbian nation created Yugoslavia. It did not pull the trigger for the destruction of Yugoslavia. But regardless of who pulled it, I do not believe that there is even one painful question, be it national or territorial, that cannot be resolved by peaceful means. I simply have a certain feeling that the Serbs and Croats are so tired of this—and I cannot say hatred, because the Serbian response has never been hatred, that has come from the other side—rather, these misunderstandings that we are already getting sick of it. Reason will have to prevail.

[VJESNIK] You say that hatred comes from the other side. I have the feeling that you are working on implanting hatred in the Serbian nation, because in Nova Pazova you say that there is no Yugoslavia without Croatia, but immediately you add that "every idea with its roots in the Croatian nation, whether it came from the extreme right or left, is anti-Serbian."

[Draskovic] Right, but ideas are something that are not forever. From Strossmayer to this day, I have yet to see a political force in Croatia that has preached love towards Serbia, a small exception being the university youth in Zagreb in 1907 and several shining exceptions in Dalmatia.

[VJESNIK] You believe that this is rooted in and accepted by the Croatian nation. Are you making an accusation?

[Draskovic] This is a fundamental consideration. With terrible propaganda, Hitler led the German nation in the slaughterhouse. Now it is obvious, when there is no Hitler, that Germany can be led in a different direction. It depends on what policy is imposed on the nation.

[VJESNIK] You contend that "the wheel of history" can go backwards. It appears that you have given it a good "spin" in that direction. But do you not think that Serbian intellectuals see the new shifts towards democracy and constitutional law differently than you? Have you taken a good look at who is following you? What kind of people are they?

[Draskovic] We have 200,000 members, and represented among them are all social groups, all classes of the Serbian nation: intellectuals, professors, doctors, teachers, workers. I must say that for the most part they are workers and those born after 1955.

Secondly, I have spun the wheel back, but in the way that the Romanians have spun it. Are you trying to say that the German social democracy of Willy Brandt is a step backward compared to the Hitlerism that buried social democracy, that Gorbachev is turning the wheel back, that Havel is leading the Czechoslovak nation on a backward course? You see that sometime in the future it is not possible to avoid stepping backward a little. This is not about turning the wheel backward, it is about getting the wheel out of the mud. We have not gone back, we have simply planted ourselves in the mud.

The Ozone Will Be Felt

[VJESNIK] I asked you if you do not regard it as a backward course, like some other Serbs and intellectuals in other parts of the country.

[Draskovic] Every man to his taste. We have all become more or less politically committed, and there is already such a tragic situation in the political situation that even the arts and science have to react. Everybody has their own views and ideas, and ideas should be added to so that they will crystallize. They should be given to the

people so that they can decide. Let someone form a fascist party in Serbia, and see how many Serbs join it. After having a good laugh they will call it "the party of three followers."

[VJESNIK] It takes you a long time to come to your senses. After one such episode, you wrote to your fellow writer, Ismail Kadare, that you acknowledge that you spent your "happiest years as a dazed mercenary of Greater Albania." You recently told your colleagues about how "the doors of coming to one's senses are continually open." What and when have you come to realize this time?

[Draskovic] Not when, but if. If the facts were to change my mind, then I would respect that knowledge and those facts. Obstinacy is what I scorn most of all. There are at least 10 rooms in each of my thoughts. And it is very difficult to express a definite opinion on any subject. The people can improve themselves, and that is their duty.

[VJESNIK] Right now your enthusiasm goes out to "rightist therapy for our leftist misfortune," as you say. I must remind you of the saying by Izidora Sekulic: "The poor are our enthusiasm."

[Draskovic] You mention enthusiasm. I am not enthusiastic about anything. I have never been utterly convinced of anything; I do have convictions, but he who is definitively convinced is definitively incorrigible.

[VJESNIK] To conclude, I will not ask you what others ask you, or directly call you a nationalist or Chetnik. I will simply tell you that I will not sign a membership application for Serbian National Renewal, but that I will not object to your further presenting its draft program and supporting it. This says something about you and me, and about the fact that democracy is a difficult science.

[Draskovic] You have seen that we have appealed to our supporters to join with the representatives of other parties in Serbia and elsewhere, regardless of the program that they support, in maintaining and fostering relations of maximum democratic tolerance. I am afraid that we need time to learn this. We have been brought up in one system for 50 years, where contrary thinking was declared hostile thinking. This is not easy to change. This exclusiveness is no longer the sole property of the communists. The virus has spread throughout the majority of the people. It is the product of half a century of upbringing. We cannot change it over night. Nor do we have a right to tell you what the other path is. It is a rather painful transformation. During these electoral, ideological, and national races, many people will say somewhere in their subconscious, "The days of Titoism were wonderful," because to many it will be as if, "Lord God, save me from myself." But when all that passes, that thunder, once the clouds are gone, we will feel the ozone.

Police Brutality Aggravates Situation in Kosovo

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[Article by Veton Surroi: "Monopoly of the Nightstick"]

[Text] The best definition of the scope for democratic political life was given on 24 January by the participants in the Kosovo political dialogue, the demonstrators and the police, in front of the building housing the Kosovo League of Communists [LC] Provincial Committee. The narrow corridor between the powerful jets from the police water cannon, and the long rampart of the swinging nightsticks of the special police units through which a stampede of demonstrators passed, trampling the weakest ones, once again provided in its own way the imprint of Kosovo politics, or of the police—it is all the same. Two days later, what had begun as a protest meeting of 10,000 Albanians in front of the Provincial Committee building in Pristina, with political demands for a multiparty system, cancellation of the state of emergency, the liberation of political prisoners, a halt to political trials, free elections, a referendum on the fate of Kosovo, and the resignation of the entire Kosovo leadership had grown into massive demonstrations by Albanians throughout the province, with the intensity of the protests ranging from work stoppages at many collectives to real clashes in the streets between groups of up to 2,000-3,000 demonstrators (in Podujevo, Titova Mitrovica, Uroševac, and some parts of Pristina) and strong police forces, special detachments equipped with bullet-proof vests, water cannons, and armored cars.

The spirit of Kosovo's spiraling violence and political conflicts outside of Kosovo had emerged once more from the bottle that was never democratically closed. While it is still uncertain what the consequences in terms of human lives will be from the latest wave of protests, it is quite obvious that the initial demands for democracy have become secondary, both for the demonstrators and for officials. Through inertia, as early as 24 January the demonstrators crossed the thin boundary between presenting political demands and venting their accumulated frustrations, a venting which included a social protest by some employees of the former Ramiz Sadiku construction combine, fear that Pristina University would be closed, as permitted by a new Serbian law, anger over the way that the cycle of Albanian demonstrations linked with the name of Azem Vllasi was dealt with last February, and the summation of the entire past year of severe repression with the slogan "No, Serbia, you will not be an empire..." While the authorities considered that afternoon ritual of venting frustrations, which began with abusive words about Rahman Morina ("Rahman, you dog, there is no place for you in Kosovo"), to be part of "well organized demonstrations based on Albanian nationalist and separatist positions," some of the participants in the demonstrations considered it to be part of a staged atmosphere in which "state-financed" people allegedly incited the rest with shouts of "Long live Adem Demaqi" and "Blood for blood." Naturally, neither side

denies that the general demands for democracy turned into a different way of expressing protest, which explains the militia's intervention.

Demonstrations Feed Repression

On the other hand, the reaction of the Kosovo leadership showed the real political balance of power in Kosovo. Not only Rahman Morina's appearance before the demonstrators but also his speech before them, accompanied by whistles and shouted insults, even though he uttered the words "democracy" and "dialogue." The leadership, which did not have the political strength to restore order that day or any other day, and instead used an ordinary police operation for that purpose, showed all its impotence once more, but also its intention to exploit these demonstrations in order to prolong its rule. In a situation in which most of the people involved in the demonstrations (probably a majority of the population) perceived the present leadership as some sort of puppet regime, the Presidium of the Kosovo LC's Provincial Committee played the trump card that every leadership has used ever since 1981—defense of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Specifically, the fact that 20,000 people were waiting in front of the Provincial Committee building for the resignations of the leadership, and the estimate that this number could have been multiplied during the next few days in all parts of Kosovo, indicate in and of themselves that the present Kosovo leadership is maintaining itself through the emergency measures and ideological support for those measures. The Kosovo leadership employed both on this occasion as well, stating that without the intervention of the militia there could have been broader disturbances and a threat to the constitutional order, and assessing that the demonstrations were caused by the activity of Albanian nationalists and separatists aimed at destroying the constitutional order.

There is not much doubt that if they had been allowed to, the demonstrations in Pristina and other Kosovo cities would have reached the scale of the November 1981 demonstrations, i.e., the participation of masses of people numbered in the hundreds of thousands. What is questionable about the assessments by the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee is the usual method of an exaggerated negative portrayal of the Albanian protests, amounting to the concept of the "Mojsov syndrome," according to which there is a 100-year plan in several stages for breaking up Yugoslavia and having the Albanians secede from it, even though the explicit political messages from the mass gatherings have been in support of Yugoslavia, or, as in this case, in support of guarantees for individual freedoms in a parliamentary democracy, regardless of how crudely those messages were conveyed. The Presidium, immediately after the demonstrations had been broken up (the meeting was held while the demonstrations were going on, and they were broken up without explicit orders from the head of the operation), noted that this had been a well-organized hostile plot with hostile

demands and the intention of destroying the legal authorities and "removing the LC from the public scene."

A Kosovo Jakes

One must believe that with these views, the Presidium of the Kosovo LC's Central Committee and the entire leadership of that province put themselves in an even more unfavorable position. In fact, by virtue of its negative portrayal of the entire content of the protests and the demands that ensued, this leadership is probably one of the only ones in the European socialist world to have renounced even verbal identification with human rights and democracy, and in the interethnic sphere, identification with a minimal democratic framework for the coexistence of members of different ethnic groups. As one foreign journalist commented, comparing the vocabulary of the Kosovo leadership with that of the "healthy forces" after the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia ("normalization" is the key word), the level of ideology here is indicated by the very wording of the claim that the demonstrators wanted to remove the LC from the public scene. Furthermore, the leadership probably does not want to accept the fact that at the moment the police take matters into their own hands, and do so for a fairly long time, the political forces in power have removed themselves from the public scene.

Nevertheless, no matter how much the official Kosovo political vocabulary may remind one of the intensity of speeches by Jakes and Honnecker before their fall, the specific Kosovo conflict between the totalitarian regime and the "demos" has specific connotations. In addition to the trump card already played of defending territorial integrity against the separatist movement, the one about the insecurity of citizens of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality has also been used, and so it was stated in the epicenter of the Serbian national movement in Kosovo Polje and its party committee that the idea that Kosovo belonged to Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and others was wrong, and that instead, one had to say that Kosovo was Serbian and had to be defended as such (Sreten Martinovic). Also, as we usually hear from Kosovo Polje leader Bogdan Kecman, it has been demanded that the Serbian inhabitants be armed, so that they can defend Serbdom and Orthodoxy against the Moslem fundamentalism and the Catholicism that are threatening it.

The fact that the Kosovo Polje statements are not merely outbursts of ethnic patriotism can be seen from the views of the Presidium of the Serbian LC Central Committee on the Kosovo demonstrations and protests, which were explicitly criticized in terms of the stereotyped framework of pro-Yugoslav and anti-Yugoslav forces. In any case, the previous concern about a loss of its monopoly of power through the introduction of a multiparty system became even more evident in the views of the Serbian party leadership that the Kosovo demonstrations were anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav in nature, and, naturally, that the demands for the introduction of a multiparty system in Kosovo could be viewed only in the context of

"new enemy tactics," a logical and pragmatic result of the knowledge that the leadership carrying out the Serbian leadership's policies in Kosovo was a product of the emergency measures, and not of free elections. The fact that it will not be easy to renounce the present concept of a draconian solution to the Kosovo crisis is also shown by Slobodan Milosevic's interview on Radio Moscow, given during the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Congress, in which the Serbian leader explained that state repression in Kosovo was needed in order to protect human rights and freedoms. Milosevic is clearly indicating that there will not be any democracy as long as the rights of Serbs and Montenegrins are threatened, and his interpretation of those rights in the past has made it clear that democracy is not possible as long as the Serbs and Montenegrins do not feel safe. If we judge by that, democracy will then be impossible for some time, primarily because the Kosovo Polje agitation mechanism can be put in motion whenever necessary. After all, statements are already being made (by Djordje Bozovic, the president of the Kosovo Assembly) about the collective spring emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo.

Only the FEC Is Saving the Situation

More than anything else, both the demonstrations and the announcements of collective migrations are trump cards in the struggle at the Yugoslav level. The demonstrators' greetings to the Slovene delegates at the congress were used as the crowning proof of ties between "Albanian separatists and the Slovene leadership." Furthermore, the now criminal demands for the protection of human rights and amnesty for political prisoners were treated at the meetings of the Kosovo LC Presidium and the leadership of the Front as proof of the joint separatist activity of the Slovene leadership and the Albanian demonstrators; this has led the new Kosovo ideologues to such equations that, to put it mildly, they arouse laughter. According to the Kosovo party's current interpretation, human rights are a Slovene separatist invention that was copied by the Albanians "for the same goals." It is still the main trump card for the Kosovo and Serbian party leaderships, however, and so even for Serbian police chief Bogdanovic, that was what "encouraged the separatist forces" after the interruption of the congress. The Kosovo demonstrations will thus continue to be used as the crowning proof that the party's instability is directly jeopardizing the integrity of Yugoslavia, and it is not far from this to the statement that a "united LCY" is the only guarantee of Yugoslavia's unity.

Nevertheless, although the Serbian and Kosovo leaderships are not politically prepared for the possibility of permitting a third voice in the federation through political pluralism (especially not now, before the constitutional changes), pluralism in Kosovo, accompanied by a significant decline in tensions between Albanians and the authorities and between Albanians and Serbs, will also probably not come about through pressure from below, i.e., pressure from Albanian demonstrations and protests, which will not only

nourish the repressive state and its need for enemies, but also inevitably lead to the transformation of democratic demands into a nationalist revolt, and thus to new problems. Pluralism will probably be brought by the federation, i.e., the political part of the Federal Executive Council's [FEC] program, which also includes a law on association and free elections; as Dr Janez Drnovsek has explained, these are also present in the SFRY Presidency's draft amendments to the Constitution.

The sound of the upcoming changes has nevertheless also been heard by the new leadership, in a most unexpected place. In fact, the side of the liberals at the above-mentioned meeting of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC's Provincial Committee was taken by none other than Kosovo police chief Jusuf Karakushi (also one of the candidates for member of the LCY Central Committee Presidium), who urged a differentiated approach toward the demonstrations and the demands expressed at them. According to Karakushi, but not the entire leadership, it is inappropriate to speak of counterrevolutionary demands if those demands, for example, are for the liberation of political prisoners or even for resignations. The surprised ideologues could not cope with this, and probably did not even understand the position of the police chief, who is increasingly answerable to the government, federal or provincial, and not to the ideological stereotypes of the party leaderships and their pragmatic goals. Thus, while some people considered Karakushi's speech and attempt (not reflected in the conclusions) to be evidence of a new FEC policy conducted through the police chain of command, others considered it an open warning that the police could not maintain the apparent truce in Kosovo indefinitely. Furthermore, Karakushi's speech might remind lovers of newspaper documentation of a similar speech by former Kosovo police chief Rahman Morina, when, in pointing out the enormous number of 500,000 cases handled by the police, he clearly made it known that the police were doing their job, but the politicians were not. Not long after those statements, Rahman Morina became the head of the Kosovo party.

The transitional period of shifting to a multiparty system was probably best explained, however, by a "closet liberal," Agim Mala, the general director of Pristina radio and television, who not only made it clear that the first phase of pluralism through so-called national parties would have to be accepted, but also stated that this acceptance would obligate the Kosovo LC to come forward with a positive program that would be above those represented by the national parties. According to Mala, most of the Albanian population now finds itself in a situation in which demonstrations are used as an argument against democratization, and when that population is faced with two options: one outlined in the party documents on Kosovo, based on differentiation and repression, and permeated by anti-Albanian and revanchist tendencies, and a second option that is acceptable to the masses and entails the thorough democratization of Kosovo society, and is permeated by nationalism in the name of democracy.

Mala's sensible approach was not acceptable to the present leadership in the current uncertain situation. After all, that leadership was not completely to blame for it at this time. In fact, when the demonstrators decided to present their demands to the party committee in the way that they did, two days after the rejection by consensus of the LCY's monopoly in society, they directly and indirectly restored that monopoly to the Kosovo LC; and the party took advantage of that service, precisely in the way that it has taken advantage of it to date.

[Box, p 26]

Macedonia: Whose Solution Lies in the Bulldozer

[By Ivo Rusi]

It is now quite clear that the tragic event in the Skopje village of Aracinovo—the implementation of a decision to bring walls into accordance with city planning and architectural standards, as Macedonian municipal authorities usually call the destruction of house walls higher than 120 centimeters—and in this connection, the death of Nuredin Nuredini (1931)—were the occasion for protest rallies in Kosovo and the expression of dissatisfaction in Macedonia as well. Flyers appeared in Tetovo and the surrounding area, and according to the politicians, unrest was observed as a result of the politicization of the tragedy. After a protest in front of the Assembly (where a coffin containing the deceased was brought), the inhabitants of Aracinovo also met with Vasilij Tupurkovski last week. In those talks, the representatives of the local community, in addition to demanding that the culprit behind this particular case be found, also presented a long list of problems, from municipal ones (water, the procedure for issuing construction permits, unemployment...) to the need to investigate the repressive and insulting attitude toward them shown by the village militia, the need to investigate the decision to destroy the walls, and a direct question about Tupurkovski's position on the right to Albanian-language education at all levels. Tupurkovski's statement in this conversation and later in front of the assembled peasants was crucial in cooling things down. In addition to repeating the Macedonian state Presidency's position that the appropriate opstina and city authorities should quickly and efficiently investigate the incident and independently take measures to hold the culprit accountable, Tupurkovski announced that in a speech before the Assembly he would soon raise the issue of investigating the decision to tear down the walls, and his view was clearly that one's right to education in one's own language was not open to question. He requested that the local residents openly and clearly present all the issues that they considered their problems, and thus eliminate those who wanted to put them in an inferior position. On the basis of not only this scandal but also the one concerning Vevcan and the Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Tupurkovski also announced that specific initiatives would be undertaken in the Macedonian Assembly against all forms of repression.

Petar Gosev, in a statement for our newspaper, also considered the specific event in Aracinovo in a broader context. "It is sad and difficult to confront such cases, because a justifiable question remains: how could that be avoided? That is a question that has full moral and human significance, because it involves an irreplaceable loss of human life. That case is a great warning for the bureaucratic sluggishness and insufficient awareness leading to the risk of such unfortunate incidents. Our coexistence and mutual trust must also not be jeopardized by rigid administrative decisions about the 'common good,' or by the lack of a feeling for our own problems and the common ones, or by the unnecessary and extremely harmful politicization and manipulation of national feelings."

Measures for Rehabilitation of Banks Discussed

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[Article by Vladimir Grlickov: "The Banking System: Contingent Rescue"]

[Text] There are no precise figures on the size of the real losses of the banks, but it is quite certain that they will nevertheless be considerably less than the original estimate (three years ago) of \$9 billion. The figure now being mentioned is between \$5 and \$6 billion for the latent amount (the amount coming due in one year is, of course, less), and the explanation for the improved situation, along with the "contribution" of the accounting system, might also be that the banks, anathematized as they have been by the policy of high interest rates, have managed to diminish the adverse financial effects. But even the sum of between \$5 and \$6 billion represents a high amount of losses, losses which cannot be covered by the capital "created" of about 30 billion dinars and the undistributed profit of 7.5 billion dinars (calculated on the basis of the mid-year figures for 1989). The reference here is, of course, to losses of the banks, which occur because of the occurrence of assets on balance sheets which represent bad or dubious debts and debts difficult to collect, and another item that should be included here is what are called contaminated short-term credits (52 billion dinars according to an estimate made on the basis of undertakings for 1988), which could not be collected and whose revalued interest (and in some cases even real interest) has been added to the principal. The "portfolio" of bank credits would certainly be included as well (doubtful credits taken from other banks have been included). These amounts of bank losses did not include those which occurred on the basis of foreign exchange savings (\$10 billion) and certain foreign credits (between \$4 and \$7 billion). After all, even these once again represent bad loans which the banks made in the past, they are a concern of the state, which has an obligation to cover them (to service them from the federal budget). We are not exactly "discovering America" when we point up this fact, since all the mistakes in banking, regardless of whether they occurred through poor use of foreign exchange savings or other credits

(bad loans), should be given the same treatment during financial rescue, that is, it has to be accomplished in any case. For that matter, the commitment in the reform is to rescue the banking system as a whole. It is our intention to point out how the rescue should be done so that it (that is, the banks) is used as a means of broadest change of ownership as an essential prerequisite on which the effectiveness of a market economy depends.

The Role of the Agency

The law adopted at the level of the Federation makes it possible to establish an agency whose first task would be to concern itself with the rescue of the banks, and then would also take over the function of insuring savings; in time, once the situation has been straightened out with the losses of the banks, it would become primarily, as in the countries with an advanced financial structure, a business institution whose task would be this latter function (insuring savings). That is, the principal task of this agency is to rescue the banks by taking over the losses, that is, by taking over those assets on the balance sheet which represent bad debts and debts difficult to collect. The banks would thereby be permanently freed of worry about those uncollectible loans, since the agency would furnish them the revenues which they (the banks) never could have realized, since they cannot collect the loans with interest. The basis for guaranteeing the banks "collection" of these loans would be federal bonds under a law that is to be adopted in a few days in the Assembly. The bonds would cover about \$2.5 billion of the bad debts the banks have on their balance sheet (another part of the bad debts would presumably be the concern of the republics, provinces, and opstinas), on which an interest of 7 percent per annum would be paid. In practical terms, this would be "fresh" money for the banks (\$160 million a year) which, along with \$100 million for "outright rescue," must certainly not be committed to noneconomic functions. The intention is that this would be the basis for creating reserves which, at the end of 10 years, the banks would commit to paying off old debts.

In assuming the role of rescuer, the government agency, or the National Bank until that agency is established and set up, would be establishing a relation with the banks on a purely business footing, which is the only arrangement that makes any sense. The interest of the state here, regardless of whether it is represented by the agency or the National Bank, is above all to reduce the use of its funds at a time when it is increasingly difficult to furnish them from the budget and when monetary interventions must necessarily be reduced. The state is in a position to make the rescue directly contingent upon adoption of the new market-oriented rules of the game, since only in that way, viewed over the long run, can it reduce its interventions. And those new market-oriented rules should reduce the business of the banks to what in everyday jargon is called the limits of available real assets and capital. Actually, all of these business criteria which the banks must adopt if they are to count on support of the state, are bound up with capital (reserves). At the same time, in view of the specific unfavorable situation, they

are considerably less stringent than in market economies; but in our context they nevertheless represent commencement of application of "restrictive principles," as can be seen from the fact that the so-called multiplier, which is obtained as the ratio of outstanding credit extended to the volume of capital (including reserves) has been reduced to 15 (in advanced economies, it is about 8); the ratio of foreign credit to capital (including reserves) is 4; the ratio of foreign guaranties issued to capital (including reserves) is 2; and the ratio of credits taken in the country to capital (including reserves) is 1.

There is one other important criterion here: the ratio of savings to capital and reserves in banks was 1:7, which can be taken as a surprise. After all, savings represent a considerably larger proportion on the balance sheet of the banks than allowed by this criterion. But the intention is not to discourage the banks from engaging in savings transactions, but to encourage them to "work" to build up their basic capital and reserves and thus create room for themselves to save. Another aim behind this severe criterion is that all banks whose savings exceed these limits would grow to become what they are, savings banks whose organization and management would be established according to the private ownership structure of the sources of resources.

Establishment of the government agency and the intention to "replace" it temporarily in the rescue transactions by the National Bank of Yugoslavia strikes one at first as a desire to create some government center that would always be a safe "refuge" and safety for those operating at a loss regardless of their business performance. We can conclude from numerous conversations with the authors of the idea of establishing the agency that those are not the intentions. On the contrary, the government agency would have an important role in "creating" the new market-oriented type of banks and enterprises, and its example would be followed by similar regional institutions that would also be concerned with these matters (although there are those who say that they should not be established, but rather the matter should be regulated from a single place, which would require removing constitutional impediments). Above all, and this is evident from the fact that the ultimate goal is that the basis of its operation be advancement of banking, and it would become primarily an institution for ensuring the savings deposits in banks, and it would build up the material basis for performing that function with insurance premiums that would be paid by the banks themselves. It is already foreseen that \$100 million will be furnished for this year in this manner. To what extent the agency or the National Bank of Yugoslavia will be able to immediately furnish those additional amounts from the banks is a big question. But if the agency or the National Bank of Yugoslavia shows a deficit, the possibility is not excluded of monetary interventions, which, of course, would not upset the globally adopted restrictive antiinflation revenue in this sector (this monetary element was in fact calculated into the

projection). The pace of abandoning the principle of the general "unlimited" state guaranties of savings, which certainly does not furnish an incentive for market-oriented (profitable) business operation, also depends, it is certain, on how fast the principle of the new method of insuring savings is realized.

Ownership

There is a perhaps more important fact to be found in the law in question which makes it evident that establishment of the state agency was not motivated by the intention of creating a "collection center" for those who are operating at a loss. Its task will not only be to take over the bad debts of the banks, but to make this conditional upon business operation according to the new market-oriented principles, going even so far as to "impose" the rule that the rescue be covered with new payments by the founders themselves, who otherwise would lose that status (of founders of the bank). Another motive was to make the rescue contingent upon changes in the personnel structure of the banks, which would be done in cases when it believes this to be necessary. This has to do with changes in the bank's management.

This latter right would certainly open up the possibility of relating the rescue to the quality of the people managing the banks and making decisions in them, although this touches upon the question of the extent to which these criteria are possible unless there are changes in the general environment in which local politics has a dominant influence on the banks as well as on the personnel structure within them. But if the principle of market-oriented rescue of the banks is insisted on consistently, and this depends (also) on the decisions of those for whom reform is a political objective, the chances of influencing business changes become greater.

As for the problem of ownership and decisionmaking, whose solution is crucial to the success of the new market-oriented rescue of the banks, at least viewed on paper, it seems no longer to exist. The problem of separating decisionmaking in the banks from the function of governance by the stockholders has been solved using a model taken from market economies: the professional management of the banks is given the appropriate power. But the basic problem of ownership of the stockholders, that is, of socially owned enterprises, remains open, since there is no titleholder of the property. To be sure, it would be the task of the government agency which is being founded to tackle this problem as well. The intention is clearly stated that the agency would transform the bad debts taken over from the banks, which are nothing other than assets representing the debts of enterprises (this is the other side of the coin of those assets) which they cannot pay on time—into ownership shares. The agency would offer for sale those debts of enterprises under equal conditions to entities from the various ownership sectors; private and foreign persons, private firms and other enterprises interested in these transactions would compete on an equal footing. It is assumed, of course, that the price offered for sale of these

debts will be realistic, that is, acceptable in view of the condition of the enterprise and also the capabilities of the future purchasers. If these are exclusively private purchasers, they would thereby become the only stated and entitled owners of a socialized enterprise. In practical terms, transformation of ownership would thereby take place. The problem of transformation has also been solved in the case when the state, alone or together with private persons, shows an interest and purchases the debts of delinquent enterprises from the government agency.

One should certainly not get the idea that this has solved the problem of ownership once and for all. It is not solved, after all, by a single act in the agency; that kind of "revolution" requires changes in overall political-economic relations, including those which round off and territorialize financial and economic flows. Under those conditions, the least likely possibility is the free and open sale of debts, that is, of enterprises, which are far from being freed of the ownership of the local bureaucracy.

Losses and the "New" Banks

Adoption of the laws on the financial rescue and bankruptcy of banks, on the government agency and its functions being taken over by the National Bank until it is established, and on the federal bonds, offers an occasion to look at the problem of financial rescue from another angle. The entire "package" which these laws comprise arrived somewhat late relative to the process of transformation that began much earlier, that is, the process of establishment of the new banks. The mistake was in the order in which the moves were made—after all, if it was not possible to do the financial rescue first and make the process of transformation contingent upon adoption of the new market-oriented rules of the game, care should at least have been taken to make these two processes simultaneous.

So, first came the process of transforming and setting up the "new" banking structure, in the absence of federal influence related to the financial rescue, since the federal government did not influence the new organization, personnel policy, and so on. This does not mean, of course, that the thing has definitely "failed," since new financial rescues must follow at some point. But in any case an occasion was missed and a time for changes, and also the possibility of market selection within the framework of the "old" banking structure. And there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that within the framework of that structure there were banks which by our standards stand out with their business performance (there were even those which had an 82-percent proportion of "first-class" assets) and with their good personnel structure.

It is interesting in this connection that there are cases when the "new" banking structures are calling for financial rescue along the old organizational line out of a desire to protect their successful "old" segments against a siphoning off of their capital on behalf of those who have losses. In this financial rescue "game," the National

Bank has even consented, following compromises in the Assembly to be sure, to adopt that solution which in essence best suits it (since it thinks that in this way it will augment its influence during financial rescue and retain quality bank management that is ready for the new market-oriented conduct of business). Today, the situation is complicated because in the political warfare being waged among the republics and provinces (and) across various kinds of economic prohibitions—counterblows are being hinted at to the effect that federal financial rescue of the banks will not be allowed in the “old” structure, which operates like a kind of revenge on certain republics which had previously caused economic damage. This would mean that the already scarce capital would have to be spent on unproductive financial rescue that would not contribute to development. We are not going into all this merely to “condemn” an atmosphere which is inadvisably shutting off economic and financial flows—but to point out that unless it is changed, there can be no question of evaluating business operation with market criteria nor indeed of financial rescue of the banks. Those things cannot occur, or, stated differently, in the best case they can occur only as the result of a “combination” of political circumstances (because at a particular moment this suits someone on grounds related to the interests of the republic and the nationality).

In speaking about financial rescue of the banks, it would be “unfair” to omit the important area of foreign exchange savings, however much it might appear that losses on this basis have been “straightened out long ago”; losses on this basis have been turned into a public debt of the Federation which it must regularly service with funds from the federal budget. Here, it would be an illusion to think that this problem has been definitively removed from the agenda either, since it is not certain that the funds envisaged to cover the interest on foreign exchange savings (and their possible reduction) can be regularly furnished because of the frequent “shortages” in the budget.

The “greatest relief” for the state, that is, for monetary policy, would perhaps be the solution of opening up even here the possibility of turning savings into permanent ownership shares in enterprises in which they were at one time invested. As a matter of fact, this possibility for transforming savings into shares does exist, and the banks are planning even now to issue the shares which make that possible; and this would apply not only to old savings, but also when there is an inflow of “new” money. Certainly, the success of this issue of stock is in this case expressly related to the confidence placed in the

bank where the capital is invested. That is why the banks usually guarantee the purchasers of the shares prior right to the payment of dividends. This is capital which is permanently associated with the bank (the right to withdraw the principal is relinquished), but the possibility would exist of gaining access to the principal (with the accrued dividend) through sale of the bank shares on the market. (The possibility of visible economic selection of the banks is created through the market quotations of the value of the shares.)

No important results should be anticipated at first from the offering of shareholding to individuals; that is why the banks are not looking to large amounts in issuing this type of share. The essential thing, however, is that the first sampling of opinion indicates an interest on the part of individuals, especially on the part of those who are quite well-off and for whom the capitalization of property is a principal concern. They believe that this is an opportunity for them to realize higher yields from savings than in conventional time deposits.

Another point is that the effects of turning savings into stock shares would be greater if this possibility were extended to enterprises, but these would have to be shares that bear the full right of ownership (management), along with the risk on the part of the person investing his savings or capital, which also presupposes variability of the yield (the dividend) as a function of the enterprise's business performance.

Certainly, the financial rescue of the banks should not be viewed in isolation from financial rescue of the economy. After all, these processes cannot be separate; there is no logic with which one could prove that sound financial rescue of the banks is possible without the same thing occurring with the enterprise. Unfortunately, for the present there have been no sound steps taken with the enterprises, even though they have been relieved of the burden of debt, and there have been no changes in ownership, it is business as usual with the unproductive segment of production and the employed labor force, and, worst of all, management teams ready and able to make the transition to independent business operation (in accordance with the reform) are being removed. Under those conditions, nothing encouraging can happen except that the state, by taking over the obligation of financial rescue, provided it manages to furnish the funds planned for that purpose, can relieve the banks of concern about their survival, and thereby also of the need to seek revenues and a way out for themselves through “astronomically” high interest rates. Even these last results (through interest) will be quickly spent if the basis for creation of new losses remains in place.

HUNGARY

MiG-23 Crash: Commander Recounts Control Tower Events

90EC0345A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
29 Jan 90 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Air Force Colonel, Unit Commander Attila Kositzky, First Lieutenant Zoltan Perjesi, and Lieutenant Colonel Gyorgy Kiss, by Janos Czingraber, place and date not given: "At Papa, Following the Plane Crash"]

[Text] A black flag flies over the gate of the Papa Military Air Base, a symbol of mourning over the deaths of two outstanding airmen in Friday's [26 January] catastrophe, and also an expression of the mood of the base's entire personnel. Colonel Attila Kositzky, the unit's commander, recounts the facts of the plane crash, and I have the feeling that his terse sentences mask the greying soldier's emotions.

[Begin interview] [Kositzky] I personally commanded the flights on Friday morning. At 0838, I gave Ferenc Bako and Robert Reinhardt permission to carry out their assigned exercise north of the Szany-Repcelak line.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What was the exercise?

[Kositzky] A flying instructor's check flight. According to orders, Robert Reinhardt was flying the plane. (The colonel must have thought everything through a thousand times. He gives the data from memory, as if reading them from the log.) At 0903, the MIG-23 reported that it had reached its assigned air space and was beginning the exercise. The plane was clearly visible on the radar screen. At 0905, in response to a question, it gave its altitude as 1,000 meters. We called the plane again between 0907 and 0909, but by then it did not reply.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What do you suspect in such cases?

[Kositzky] Several situations are possible. The radio might have broken down, but the plane is there on radar. If it is flying low, the plane might disappear from the radar screen, but is still in radio communication. If that breaks down, a special alarm must be switched on in the plane, causing a particular signal to appear on many radar screens. We did not experience that, either.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As commander, what action did you take in the given situation?

[Kositzky] We had also several other planes in the air, and I instructed them to call the MIG. Meanwhile, I reported the situation to the Budapest Air Control Center and phoned Szentkiralyzsabadja to send out a search helicopter in the direction of Papa.

[NEPSZABADSAG] At that time were you still hoping that, even if the plane had crashed, the pilots had ejected from it?

[Kositzky] The ejection seat, too, has its radio signal. That signal is transmitted to us, and also to an international satellite system. We did not receive such emergency signals.

The time was flying by. When I asked the colonel about his emotions in that nerve-racking uncertainty, he became a shade paler but continued his narrative.

[Kositzky] There were five of us around the radio. There is no unnecessary talk at such times, only instructions. One is ordered to do this; the other, to phone so and so; the third, to contact the other planes. The pilot of one of the other planes, for instance, saw some kind of fire when he broke through cloud cover. On my orders, he dropped to 500 meters and then to 300. "Thank God, it is only stubble fire," he reported.

The catastrophe was confirmed around 1000 hours: The Kapuvar police phoned that a plane had crashed in the Beled area, 40 km northwest of Papa, at 0936. The search helicopter was directed there immediately. It reported that an ambulance and firemen were at the scene, and that the pilots were lying dead in the wreckage. The colonel handed over command and hurried personally to the crash site. There, investigators from the military prosecutor's office in Gyor were already at work; if they establish negligence, the case would be assigned to that office.

Forty soldiers were collecting the pieces of wreckage. Meanwhile, provisions were being made to notify the families of the victims.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What could have caused the accident?

[Kositzky] All we can say is that there is no crater at the crash site: The plane reached the ground at a slight angle and at a relatively slow speed. Everything else will have to be determined by the investigation. We have found the flight recorder, and the film in it can readily be evaluated. It will be necessary to determine what happened in the last 30 or 40 seconds. That will require mathematics, aerodynamics, gas dynamics, and many other scientific tools. One thing is certain: The plane exploded when it hit the ground, and not in the air.

The wreckage was brought to the barracks in trucks. After cleaning, the pieces will be put together like a mosaic and will have very much to tell the experts. That will not help the victims any, but it will certainly help the living. Several officers declared in complete agreement that only the most thorough uncovering of every detail can restore their faith, courage, and self-confidence after such a catastrophe. [end interview]

I asked First Lieutenant Zoltan Perjesi, who also was to have flown that day, whether pilots were afraid after such an accident.

[Begin interview] [Perjesi] Anyone who is afraid has no business flying. A person reviews for himself the whole accident and thinks about what he would do if he were

up there in trouble. The only thing that helps is for me to know exactly what happened.

[NEPSZABADSAG] With what feelings will you take off next time?

[Perjesi] We have to get over it. But when I see my own kids, I will be thinking of Robi's three little ones.

[Kiss] Robi Reinhardt's brother is in the Army, also a captain. Hours after the accident, when we were certain that Robi had died, a voice over the telephone said: "This is Captain Reinhardt speaking." My hope flared briefly and I asked instinctively, "Robi is that you"? [end interview]

We remain silent. That was eerie.

The Papa officers sitting opposite me are tired, sad, determined. They are now pouring out words that had started so slowly. I suspect that this, too, helps them ease their terrible pain and resolve their tension. The tension, of course, is a part of their jobs and lives. From their broken and occasionally halting sentences it is evident that work, flying, is the only remedy for restoring their equilibrium.

As I take leave of them, they are already talking about tomorrow's flight assignments.

The Hungarian People's Army has added the names of pilots Colonel Ferenc Bako and Captain Robert Reinhardt to its honor roll.

HUNGARY

'Bridge Group' Member Explains Purpose, Function

25000687B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
11 Mar 90 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Dr. Laszlo Csaba, KOPINT-Datorg division director and member of the "Bridge Group," by Zsuzsa Regos; place and date not given: "Bridge Group on the Edge of the Course"]

[Text] The working committee that calls itself the "Bridge Group" is supported by the Soros Foundation, is composed of Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] experts, and deals with economic issues. Its members believe that there is still room for action and that it would make sense to take action. On the other hand, we may have to wait for miracles if this year also passes by without action. Dr. Laszlo Csaba, a division director at KOPINT-Datorg, and a member of the group, does not believe in miracles.

[Csaba] Three- and six-month programs serve the purpose of defining specific steps the new government will have to face after the elections. Quite obviously, society will provide greater support to the new government, which in turn will be able to take those unpopular steps which may stop the process of economic disintegration and may start progressive programs.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In what respects does this three-month program differ from the earlier one-year and five-year programs?

[Csaba] As far as I am concerned I do not regard the earlier plans as serious. With their macroeconomic calculations these plans produced indexes which are unsuitable for purposes of international comparison. Their greatest shortcoming was that they did not state the specific methods and pace by which tasks should be accomplished, and did not accept the social conflicts which accompany such measures. The Bridge Group did not invent hot water, it only followed the economic examples that were produced in the West.

[NEPSZABADSAG] After enumerating the danger zones in your program, you describe your crisis management program item by item. It consists of several packages. You conclude this statement by saying that if the government performs these tasks, transformation of the economic structure may begin without threat of collapse. Are you certain of this?

[Csaba] We have discussed the program with the present government and with representatives of a number of parties. We are in agreement. And yet, things do not take place the way we would like them to.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Why? What would you like to see?

[Csaba] First of all, we have prepared our study in hopes of continuity. We would like to see the improvisation in

governmental work that was characteristic of the 1980's discontinued. Continued improvisation could present a very great danger, because at present the CEMA countries are experiencing a crisis of a kind the world has not seen since 1929-33, and Hungarian society is drifting toward a social catastrophe.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Many have accused you of scaring the people with triple-digit inflation and with the specter of hundreds of thousands of unemployed, and that you want to enlist all political forces in support of the outgoing government.

[Csaba] These statements are not true. We believe that they accomplished the partial measures of liberalization in an isolated manner and out of context, and that under present circumstances the lack of financial, budgetary, credit, tax, and competition policies—mostly due to the absence of bankruptcy proceedings—are unable to appropriately slow down the pace by which money is deteriorating. Already the existing, moreover the planned, inflation rate is excessive. But we truly regard inflation as Public Enemy No. 1, and therefore we would like to see moderating factors put into action with regard to both prices and wages. We do not recommend either a price or a wage freeze on the grounds of both political and economic considerations. Our materials do not include such recommendations. In our view, official prohibitions are insufficient for a strategic rethinking of CEMA relations, and for accomplishing a change in direction in the external market. We encourage state household reform. This requires a review of the heretofore unfounded, and excessive acceptance of governmental obligations, and a fundamental reduction diet for the state and the state administration, independent of the moving back and forth of individual social security and social burdens within the budget.

Quite naturally, we do not wish several hundreds of thousands of unemployed persons upon Hungarian society. This is not part of the Bridge program. It is our program to stimulate entrepreneurship and supply. We do not want to line anyone up in support of the outgoing government. Our goal was to see to it that the unavoidable continuity in economic processes would mean as small a predestination as possible for the future democratic government.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is your next task?

[Csaba] We are working on the medium-range indebtedness strategy. We examine how the budget and state household management could be transformed. We are dealing with the mutability of the present agricultural structure, because in our view an agriculture that functions on the basis of market principles—the way the Smallholders perceive it—does not have much reality to it. Organizing and bringing about an agriculture like that would cost a tremendous amount of money.

Those who know soccer say that one must score during the first five minutes of the game, so that the team may gain time for the next, not always successful, action. In

Hungary today the game is on with the exchange players. Foreign bankers hope that we finally score with our ball in the net. There are quite a lot of trainers at the edge of the field dispensing advice. It is likely that it will depend on the technique and strategy of the forward when our ball is kicked into the net.

World Bank Economist on Kornai's 'Passionate Pamphlet'

25000687A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
8 Mar 90 p 4

[Letter from World Bank expert Bela Balassa: "Debate Over the 'Passionate Pamphlet': a Need for Import Competition"—first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] Great interest has been expressed in Janos Kornai's book. We conclude the debate concerning his writing by publishing a letter we received from the United States, from a well-known World Bank expert of Hungarian origin.

I welcome the fact that Kornai underscores the importance of a stabilization policy. This is indeed a primary requirement for discontinuing the inflationary pressure. I also agree with the idea that restoring a balanced budget is the sine qua non of stability at the macroeconomic level, and that achieving a balanced budget demands that expenditures, and particularly subsidies, be reduced. On the other hand, I would add to this the necessity of a conservative monetary policy, because such policies have been overly expansionary in Hungary thus far.

While fiscal and monetary policies restrain inflation in terms of demand, an appropriate wage policy is needed in order to avoid inflation on the expenditure side. Kornai is correct when he says that this would necessitate limitations on wage increases.

But what should be done with prices? Kornai suggests that prices should be adjusted to prices that prevail in capitalist countries. This, however, is easier said than done; such an adjustment cannot be accomplished in the absence of import competition. At the same time, under the oligopolistic conditions that exist in Hungary, the prices will not convey the fact that resources are scarce.

The need for import competition is also signaled by these considerations. Kornai discusses import competition; this, however, barely exists under the present conditions. Import liberalization is needed, and this requires foreign exchange.

Foreign exchange may be acquired through increased exports. But a realistic exchange rate is required in order to increase exports. Since increasing exports takes time, there is also a need for foreign financial support. Along with reducing the debt service burden, some new money is needed. The Polish Government understood this well, and this should also be stressed in relation to Hungary.

Kornai is correct when he underscores the significance of liberalizing the conditions under which the private sector operates. At the same time however, Kornai, in essence, would delay reforming the state sector. This, in turn, would slow down the reform process, because the state sector still dominates the Hungarian economy, and this situation would change only slowly with the growth of the private sector.

I would prefer to see the transformation of state processing industry enterprises in the way that was recommended by Marton Tardos. In essence this would mean the transfer of state ownership rights to banks, insurance companies, and other institutions. The new owners would expect managers to maximize profits while they compete in the marketplace. At the same time, firms that are unable to survive the withdrawal of subsidies must be liquidated.

I hope that Kornai's book means the beginning of a productive debate in Hungary, one that also contributes to the development of a program of action for the new government to be established after the elections.

BULGARIA

Public Health Service Restructuring Described

90EB0294A Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 29 Dec 89 pp 2-11

[Text]

Council of Ministers Decree No. 61 of 18 December 1989 on the Restructuring of Health Care

In accordance with the "Basic Trends In the Further Restructuring of Health Care in the Bulgarian People's Republic," the Council of Ministers decreed:

Article 1. Ministries and other departments, executive committees of people's councils, companies, and other economic organizations, in coordination with the respective social organizations shall:

1. Provide healthy conditions for the raising of children and for the schooling, labor, living, and recreation facilities of the citizens in accordance with the standards of sanitation and hygiene and the requirements of preventive health care;
2. Ensure the interaction between health care activities and mass physical culture, sports, and recreation in companies and other economic organizations, schools, higher educational institutions, and municipalities;
3. Provide the necessary financial conditions and material facilities for mass and individual culture, sports, and tourist activities of students, young people, and the population.

Article 2. By 31 December 1990 the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Public Services must update the standards governing the building of open and enclosed sports installations in schools, higher educational institutions, companies and other economic organizations, housing complexes, and other public buildings.

Article 3. (1) By 30 June 1990, the Ministry of Public Education, in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare must improve the curriculums of students in accordance with their psychological and physical level of maturity and development.

(2) For students through the fourth grade daily class attendance in school must not exceed four hours.

(3) Before 30 September 1990 the Ministry of Public Education, the Committee for Science and Higher Education, and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, coordinated with the Central Committee of the

Dimitrov Communist Youth Union must adopt programs for systematic educational and propaganda activities aimed at promoting the health and sexual upbringing of the young generation and its preparedness for family life.

Article 4. (1) By 31 December 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the Medical Academy must update physiological standards and nutritional diets for the different age and professional population groups.

(2) Starting with 1 January 1991 departments, companies, and other economic organizations must make the production of food products and precooked diet foods consistent with the adopted health standards, Bulgarian state standards, and sectorial standards.

(3) Starting with 1 January 1991 the producers of food products must indicate on the packaging the content, structure, and caloric value of the products.

(4) By 31 December 1990 the Ministry of Internal Trade must update prescription catalogues for public catering.

Article 5. Funds from fines levied by state sanitary control authorities must be used specifically for disease prevention activities.

Article 6. The executive committees of the people's councils must ensure with their annual plans the necessary resources and ceilings for activities related to health care and social welfare.

Article 7. (1) Gradually, starting with 1 January 1991, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the executive committees of people's councils must organize health services to the population by family physicians or teams of family physicians in the health care sections; by 1995 conditions must be created for one family physician to care for no more than 1,500-1,700 people.

(2) By 31 March 1990 the minister of public health and social welfare must issue a regulation on the rights and obligations of the family physician.

(3) The family, shop, and school physician must also have the rights of state sanitary inspector.

Article 8. (1) The Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the executive committees of the people's councils must:

- 1. Ensure, on a priority basis, the building of basic facilities and the activities of polyclinics as the main health units, and convert them into highly specialized diagnostic-consultation, treatment, and rehabilitation centers;
- 2. They must develop and expand patient treatment at home.

(2) By 31 March 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, in coordination with the Ministry of Finance, must set the rates for financing the treatment of bedridden patients at home.

Article 9. By 1995 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the executive committees of the people's councils must:

1. Establish:

—a. Intermunicipal specialized diagnostic-consultation centers;

—b. Inpatient hospitals for the treatment of acute diseases;

—c. Inpatient hospitals for support and recovery treatment, including for the chronically ill;

2. Update the internal structure of the available hospital bed facilities on the basis of socioeconomic and health-demographic criteria, with a view to upgrading the quality of inpatient hospital aid;

3. Display systematic concern for decisive improvements in hygiene, hospital procedures, and standards in inpatient hospitals and introduce mechanization in auxiliary activities.

Article 10. (1) By 30 June 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the executive committees of people's councils must take steps to improve emergency medical aid and upgrade its readiness for urgent activities in cases of natural disasters, industrial accidents, transportation accidents, and other emergency circumstances.

(2) Starting with 1991 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Economics and Planning must provide funds for expanding the facilities of the N.I. Pirogov Republic Practical Science Institute for Urgent Medical Aid.

(3) The Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the Medical Academy must:

—1. By 30 April 1990 adopt new curriculums and programs for the training, specialization, and advancement of medical cadres providing urgent medical aid;

—2. Organize, at least once every three years, courses for the advancement of all specialists working in urgent medical aid stations and units.

(4) By 31 December 1990 the Committee on Communications and Information must secure the necessary radio frequencies and communications equipment in the various parts of the country.

Article 11. In coordination with the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, the executive committees of people's councils, and the Bulgarian Association for Tourism and Recreation must ensure year-round utilization of sanatorium-resort bases, recreation and rest centers, and available climate, water treatment, and mud treatment resources.

Article 12. (1) Starting with 1 January 1990 the executive committees of people's councils must make the rural health establishments an intrinsic part of the respective consolidated rayon and municipal hospitals or urban hospitals and polyclinics.

(2) In coordination with the respective companies and other economic organizations, the executive committees of the people's councils must implement comprehensive measures to stabilize the cadres in rural health establishments by supplying them with suitable housing, additional material incentives, and jobs for the members of their families.

Article 13. Before the end of 1990 the executive committees of the people's councils, with the participation of companies, other economic organizations, and health authorities and coordinated with public organizations, must take the necessary steps leading to making decisive improvements in the protection and strengthening of the health of mothers and the growing generation.

Article 14. By 30 October 1990, the Ministry of Public Education, coordinated with the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, must draft a regulation on kindergartens, which will ensure comprehensive health preventive care, medical supervision, and upbringing based on pedagogical science.

Article 15. Starting with the 1990/1991 school year, in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, the Committee for Science and Higher Education must introduce a program for the specialized medical training of students in "Preschool Pedagogy."

Article 16. (1) Starting with the 1990/1991 school year, the institutes training secondary specialized health cadres will be converted into intermediate medical institutes.

(2) Graduates of secondary medical training establishments may acquire intermediate medical training after passing the examinations stipulated by the minister of public health and social welfare.

Article 17. As suggested by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Economics and Planning, and the Ministry of Industry and Technology, as well as the respective departments, companies, and economic organizations will ensure the production and import of the necessary prepared children's foods, in terms of quantity and variety, including preventive food for children suffering from certain diseases.

Article 18. By 30 June 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Economics and Planning, together with the National Council of the Fatherland Front and the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, must adopt a program for the development of the system of social welfare for adults, the handicapped, and children with damaged health or deprived of a normal family environment.

Article 19. In coordination with the public organizations, the executive committees of the people's councils, companies, and other economic organizations must assist in activities related to health education and help those who have suffered from specific types of diseases, people needing psychosocial assistance, etc.

Article 20. Starting with 1 January 1990, the direct leadership of the hygiene-epidemiological inspectorates and state sanitation control will come from the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare.

Article 21. (1) In the medical insurance of foreign tourists and of sports, cultural, tourist, and other activities from which the organizers earn an income, payments for medical aid will be based on a contract with the respective health establishments in accordance with a rate approved by the minister of public health and social welfare.

(2) Foreign motor vehicle drivers will pay in foreign currency the cost of tests for determining the level of alcohol in their blood in cases of violation of the Law on Road Traffic, as well as expenditures incurred in the treatment of Bulgarian citizens victims of transportation accidents caused by said foreigners.

(3) Departments and organizations which derive income from tourist or other services in foreign exchange and whose contracts stipulate medical aid to foreign citizens will pay to the respective health establishments the set fees in foreign exchange for any health assistance which may have been provided to such citizens.

Article 22. Health institutions will be financed on the basis of their activities and the medical and social efficiency they have reached. By 30 June 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare must approve the respective rates and indicators.

Article 23. (1) Health institutions will have the following sources of revenue:

- 1. Funds from the budgets of the people's councils;
- 2. Income based on fees as per Article 21 and the Tariff on Fees collected within the system of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare in accordance with the Law on State Fees (DV No. 13, 1975; amended, No. 58, 1983);
- 3. Revenue based on contracted-for additional health preventive activities of companies, collective farms, and organizations;
- 4. Revenue from payments made by health workers engaged in private and collective labor activity;
- 5. Revenue from the treatment of foreign citizens;
- 6. Gifts.

(2) The income as per paragraph 1 will be the source of funds to pay for the cost of diagnosis, treatment, and

rehabilitation of patients, wages, the training and specialization of cadres, current and general repairs and equipment, and other economic expenditures incurred by the health institution for social and cultural measures as well as for technical and equipment updating.

Article 24. (1) The Ministry of Economics and Planning and the Ministry of Finance will secure, with a plan and budget for 1990, the necessary funds for wages so as to apply as of 1 January 1990 the new system of basic wages in health care and social welfare.

(2) The starting basic wages of cadres with intermediate medical training will be based on 90 percent of the starting basic salaries of higher medical cadres in the respective qualification grades.

Article 25. (1) By 30 May 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the Committee for Science and Higher Education must improve the system for the enrollment of students and the curriculums for the training of medical cadres.

(2) The minister of public health and social welfare will determine the specific health establishments which will become clinical bases and in which highly skilled health cadres can earn scientific degrees, in accordance with the conditions and stipulations of the Law on Scientific Degrees and Scientific Titles.

(3) By 31 December 1990 the minister of public health and social welfare must approve an improved system for general and specialized scientific and technical information for physicians, dentists, and pharmacists.

(4) Starting with 1990 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the executive committees of people's councils must ensure the systematic use of contemporary information and technical facilities in the work of family physicians, polyclinics, hospitals, and other health institutions and the gradual introduction of personal electronic health insurance cards for the population.

(5) By 30 June 1990 the minister of public health and social welfare must ratify an improved system for post-graduate specialization and qualification of higher medical and other cadres, including specialists in general medicine.

Article 26. Starting with 1 January 1990 pensioned health workers will be allowed to work within the health care system and earn their full wages without losing any social security payments.

Article 27. To encourage the production of scarce medicines, medical equipment, apparatus, and other items needed by the health care system and for the technological equipping of the medical industry, starting with 1990:

1. No tax will be levied on profits from the production of medicinal drugs and items to be used in the domestic market, as per Appendix No. 1;

2. A 20-percent tax will be levied on profits from the production of medical drugs and items to be used in the domestic market as per Appendix No. 2;

3. Repayments and interest on loans for production facilities and activities related to the technological and product updating of the pharmaceutical industry will be paid out of gross income before taxes;

4. Medical industry projects will be built with no restrictions, after presentation to the bank of their technical and economic specifications in accordance with stipulated efficiency criteria.

Article 28. Currency earned from the export of medical equipment and apparatus in 1990 will be left entirely at the disposal of the producers. Such foreign exchange will be used specifically for the development and modernizing of the production of medical equipment and apparatus.

Article 29. (1) The Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare will suggest to the Ministry of Economics and Planning a nomenclature and computations concerning the necessary quantity of medicinal drugs, medical-sanitary materials, medical equipment, and medical instruments, the production of which will be assigned in the form of state orders.

(2) On the suggestion of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Economics and Planning will secure the necessary foreign exchange for importing medicinal drugs, medical-sanitary materials, equipment, and consumption items which are not produced in our country or supplied by the socialist countries.

Article 30. Starting with 1 January 1990 the State Institute for Control of Medicinal Drugs will participate in the state inspection of goods at enterprises producing medicinal drugs and medical-sanitary materials.

Article 31. It is suggested to the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, the National Council of the Fatherland Front, the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Red Cross, the Committee of Bulgarian Women, the Bulgarian Association for Physical Culture and Sports, and the Bulgarian Tourist Union, as well as to the mass information media to develop activities to enhance the health standards of the population and to apply active personal preventive measures and lead a healthy way of life.

Article 32. The Regulation on the Collective and Personal Labor Activity of Health Workers in providing additional medical aid as per Appendix No. 3 is hereby adopted.

Article 33. As of 1 January 1990 the Medical Academy will organize a Republican Scientific Center for Clinical and Experimental Medicine, as per Appendix No. 4, in order to provide accelerated scientific development and application of new methods and apparatus aimed at improving medical services to the population.

Article 34. Starting with 1 January 1990, companies and other economic organizations in the health care field will submit all withholdings for state budget in accordance with the system for the formation and expenditure of profits, to the Development and Technological Updating Fund of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare.

Concluding Stipulations

1. The Regulation on the Application of the Law on Public Health and Other Legal Acts Related to Health Care as per Appendix No. 5 is amended and supplemented.

2. The Regulation on Wage Supplements for Working Under Adverse and Other Specific Labor Conditions, as per Appendix No. 6, is amended and supplemented.

3. In the Regulation on Wages in Special Cases (DV No. 7, 1987; amended, No. 88, 1987 and No. 54, 1988), in Article 13, paragraph 1, the words "health care and social welfare" will be added after the word "construction."

4. The present resolution will become effective as of 1 January 1990 and will replace Council of Ministers Resolution No. 49 of 1989.

Georgi Atanasov, Council of Ministers chairman;

Pancho Burkalov, Council of Ministers general secretary.

Appendix No. 1 to Article 27, Point 1

Medicinal Drugs and Items on Which No Profit Tax Is To Be Levied

I. Medicinal drugs: antistenocardial, antihypertension, antiarrhythmic, antidiabetic, vasodilants, cardiotonic, antiasthmatic, analgesic—antipyretics, antirheumatic—antiinflammation, corticosteroid, antihistamine, and nivalin preparations.

II. Medical items: systems for hemodialysis (apparatus for hemodialysis, hemodialyzers, arterial and venal blood lines, solutions for hemodialysis), discardable syringes, needles, and scalpels, and other polymer medical items, implants for the human body (endoprostheses, cardiac valves, vascular prostheses, dental implants, and osteosynthetic means), consumption dental and dental technical and surgical instruments (tourniquets, hemostats, scissors), stationary diagnostic x-ray systems of average capacity (500-800 mA; 125-150 kilovolts), dental technician equipment, blood pressure measuring apparatus, and phaneroscopes.

Appendix No. 2 to Article 27, Point 2**Medicinal Drugs and Items With a 20-Percent Profit Tax**

I. Medicinal drugs: semisynthetic penicillin antibiotics, cephalosporic antibiotics, anti-Parkinson, antiulcer, infusion solutions, psychopharmacs, antineoplastics, vitamins, and infant milks for human consumption.

II. Medical items: dental equipment (dental unit with chair), equipment for intensive treatment and reanimation (couveuses, needleless syringes for insulin, infusion, peristaltic and suction pumps and monitors), gynecological-obstetric equipment (gynecological chair and table), otolaryngological unit, ultrasound diagnostic equipment, a washing machine for medical needles, specialized hospital equipment (functional and specialized hospital beds, means for internal hospital transportation, specialized means for facilitating the labor of health workers), means and aids for invalids, hearing apparatus, latex items for medical purposes, spare parts for medical equipment, consumption goods for medical equipment, sanitary-hygienic and bandaging materials, comprehensive technological equipment for the production of syringes and needles for one-time use, automated technological lines for the packaging of polymer medical items and medicinal drugs, automated technological lines and technological modules for the production of polymer medical items, syringe molds, and instruments for the production of polymer medical goods.

Appendix No. 3 to Article 32 Regulation on Collective and Individual Labor Activity of Health Workers in Providing Additional Medical Aid and Services**Section I General Stipulations**

Article 1. (1) The present regulation stipulates the conditions and procedure for organizing collective and personal labor activeness of health workers for providing additional medical aid and services to the citizens in accordance with the stipulations of the Regulation on the Collective and Individual Labor Activity of Citizens for the Additional Production of Goods and Services (DV No. 48, 1987; amended and supplemented No. 92, 1988; Nos. 15, 37, and 70, 1989).

(2) Additional medical aid and services will be provided to citizens by health workers outside of their regular working time or by citizens with the right to practice medicine who are not employed in health institutions or else who make home calls for pay. They may be provided by the wish of the patient and on the basis of the free choice made by the health worker.

Article 2. In accordance with the present regulation the following medical aid and services can be organized:

1. Examination and treatment by physicians and dentists;
2. Medical studies;

3. Medical manipulations (administration of injections, massages, physical therapy, etc.);

4. Dental technician's services;

5. General care for the sick.

Article 3. Based on their right to work, education, and qualifications, all health workers have the right to provide additional medical help and services. No legal permit is required for services as per item 5 of Article 2.

Article 4. Additional medical aid and services to citizens may be provided by:

1. Individual health workers;
2. Health collectives (teams);
3. Health cooperatives.

Article 5. Health workers who have not been employed for more than 3 months in a health institution (cooperative) but who would like to provide additional medical assistance and services, must submit a medical certificate to the effect that their state of health is consistent with the requirements relative to the type of activity they wish to perform.

Article 6. Health workers who have not practiced their profession for more than 5 years may provide additional medical assistance and services after passing the required examination as per Article 93 of the Law on Public Health.

Article 7. Health workers who provide additional medical assistance and services must:

1. Perform their professional obligations in accordance with the requirements of the laws relative to health care, observe the internal order in the institutions which employ them, and meet sanitary-hygienic standards and prerequisites;

2. Report, in accordance with procedures and within stipulated deadlines, cases of communicable, venereal, and other diseases subject to mandatory reporting.

Article 8. Physicians and, respectively, dentists who provide additional medical assistance and services have no right:

1. To issue medical certificates for temporary disability and employment and present patients for medical consultation commissions;
2. Direct patients to labor-expert medical commissions;
3. Issue health certificates to citizens;
4. Issue prescriptions for free or reduced-price drugs and medicinal items, other than in the case of children under the age of 3;
5. Perform abortions and treat pregnancy complications;
6. Perform invasive diagnostic tests and apply hypnosis and general anesthesia;
7. Keep under observation and treat patients suffering from communicable and venereal diseases;

8. Perform outpatient surgery outside health institutions;
9. Provide dental services involving the use of gold alloys except if the entire amount of gold has been procured by patients in accordance with stipulated procedures.

Article 9. Health workers who provide additional medical assistance and services must immediately direct to the respective health institution all patients to whom they are unable to provide the necessary medical assistance.

Article 10. Physicians and, respectively, dentists who provide additional medical assistance and services, will use prescription blanks based on a model approved by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare. The prescription blanks must include their full name and home address or the address of the health institution (the cooperative). The prescription must be stamped with the personal seal of the physician or the dentist or the seal of the health institution (cooperative).

Article 11. Registration and accountability documents describing the respective types of activities within the health care system must be kept in providing additional medical assistance and services.

Article 12. The material facilities of health institutions may be used for organizing additional medical assistance and services, including on Saturdays and Sundays, providing that the normal system and organization of the treatment work of the respective institution are not disrupted.

Article 13. Payment for medical assistance and services will be based on rates set by the minister of public health and social welfare.

Section II

Additional Medical Assistance and Services Provided by Individual Health Workers

Article 14. Health workers who would like to provide individual additional medical assistance and services must sign a contract with the head of the respective health institution.

Article 15. The contract as per Article 14 must include the following stipulations:

1. The obligations of the health institution, such as:
 - a. Means and procedures for the use of the necessary medical equipment, and for laboratory, functional, x-ray, and other tests and consultations with specialists;
 - b. Leasing suitable work premises, properly equipped and furnished;
 - c. Providing conditions for the performance of the necessary activities, such as heating, lighting, cleaning of premises, work clothing, consumption materials

(dental materials, disposable syringes, sterile bandages, office materials, and so on) as well as administrative services and informing the population on the variety and prices of medical assistance and services rendered;

2. Obligations assumed by the individual rendering medical assistance and services, such as:

- a. Paying a stipulated monthly rent for the use of premises, equipment, furnishings, etc., as per letters "a" and "b" of item 1, which would include amortization withholdings for equipment used;
- b. Reimbursing the health institution, on a monthly basis, for expenditures as per letter "c" of item 1;
- c. Paying a certain percentage of the earnings for the activities performed by the health institution as per "a" of item 1 and for the labor of the auxiliary personnel as per Article 16;
- d. Paying for any deliberate damage caused to the health institution.

Article 16. (1) Should physicians and dentists providing additional medical assistance and services need auxiliary medical personnel with intermediate or secondary training, on their suggestion a three-sided contract is concluded which stipulates the payments to be made for the labor of the thus employed medical personnel, as a part of the income of the physician or the dentist.

(2) If a dentist uses a dental technician, who works on the basis of a labor contract in another health institution, the contract must include both health institutions if their material facilities are used.

Article 17. Providing medical assistance and services in the homes of citizens must be based on a reciprocal agreement between the patient and the health worker who registers with the health care institution the type of medical assistance and services rendered and the income earned from such activities.

Section III

Additional Health Assistance and Services Provided by Health Collectives and Cooperatives

Article 18. Health collectives may be organized at health care institutions, on the basis of reciprocal agreement among the participating health workers who sign a constituent contract among them. The contract settles internal relations among the members of the collective, the choice of a responsible official, types of medical assistance and services to be provided, means of work, and distribution of income.

Article 19. Health collectives sign contracts with the health establishments within which they have been formed, stipulating the conditions enumerated in Article 15.

Article 20. Health cooperatives carry out their activities in accordance with the Law on Cooperative Organizations and work in premises with equipment and installations consistent with the requirements governing the respective types of activities.

Article 21. Health care cooperatives may sign contracts with health institutions for the use of premises and medical equipment and for carrying out activities under the conditions and procedures stipulated in Article 15.

Section IV

Taxation, Financing, and Social Insurance

Article 22. (1) Health workers who have earned income from activities as per the present regulation will be taxed according to their earnings as per the stipulations of the Law on the General Income Tax. Health care cooperatives will be taxed in accordance with the procedure governing cooperative organizations.

(2) Sections VII and VIII of the Regulation on Collective and Individual Labor Activity of Citizens for the Additional Production of Goods and Rendering Services will apply in terms of taxation and social security.

Article 23. The funds earned by the health care establishments as per the present regulation will be classified as their own revenue, earned as a result of additional nonplanned activities and will be used, respectively, for the following:

1. Compensation for expenditures on the basis of contracts as per Articles 15, 19, and 21;
2. Payments for the labor of health workers who have participated in carrying out additional nonplanned activities by paraclinical units, x-ray departments, dental laboratories, administrative services, etc. The specific indicators and criteria applied in determining the individual amount of additional wages will be based on the internal regulations governing the organization of wages in a health care institution.

Article 24. Health care collectives which engage in such activities as per the present regulation may use loans from the State Savings Bank for furnishing offices and other, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 30 of the Regulation on the Collective and Individual Labor Activity of Citizens for the Additional Production of Goods and Rendering Services.

Article 25. Pensioners engaged in activities as per the present regulation will receive the full amount of their pension regardless of their income from such activities.

Section V

Accountability and Control

Article 26. (1) Bookkeeping records of activities as per the present regulation will be consistent with the stipulations of Section IX of the Regulation on the Collective

and Individual Labor Activity of Citizens for the Additional Production of Goods and Rendering Services.

(2) Accountability can be based on a contract with the bookkeeping personnel of the health establishment.

Article 27. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and the other control authorities, according to their field of competence, will supervise the observance of the present regulation and activities based on it and, in particular, concerning the following:

1. Legal grounds for the exercise of activities;
2. Legal procedures for receiving, keeping, and accounting for material and monetary funds;
3. Legal accountability for work done and payment for labor;
4. Legal and prompt computation and payment of taxes;
5. Observing price regulations for provided medical aid;
6. Observing established hygiene standards and requirements and sanitary regulations;
7. Observing other legal acts pertaining to health care;
8. Quality of provided medical assistance.

Section VI

Administrative-Penal, Property, and Other Liabilities

Article 28. (1) Violators of the stipulations contained in this regulation, relative to organizing and providing additional medical assistance and services, will be held liable as per Article 32 of the Law on Administrative Violations and Penalties, unless their action entails a more severe punishment based on other laws.

(2) Violations as per paragraph 1 will be entered in a report by the authorities indicated in Article 27; penal resolutions will be issued, respectively, by the chairmen of the executive committees of municipal people's councils or the minister of public health and social welfare.

Article 29. In cases of violations of established hygiene standards, requirements, and sanitary regulations, the state sanitary control authorities will take administrative steps and impose penalties in accordance with the Law on Public Health.

Article 30. Individuals engaged in activities as per the present regulation bear property liability for malicious harm caused to health establishments. Damaged apparatus, inventory, and other material and technical facilities owned by the health establishments must be returned in proper condition by the culprits within 3 months.

Article 31. Health workers engaged in activities as per the present regulation may also be held administratively liable as per Article 102 of the Law on Public Health.

Concluding Stipulations

Only Paragraph.

The minister of public health and social welfare and the minister of economics and planning will issue instructions on problems which arise with the application of the present regulation.

Appendix No. 4 to Article 33

Establishment of a Republic Center for Clinical and Experimental Medicine

1. The Republic Scientific Center for Clinical and Experimental Medicine (RNTSKEM) of the Medical Academy is a separate juridical person with main office in Etropole and the following objects of activities: diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of Bulgarian and foreign citizens; application of new diagnostic, treatment, and rehabilitation methods; development and conduct of clinical tests for medical equipment, implants, and disposable means; postgraduate training of Bulgarian and foreign cadres.

2. The RNTSKEM will be created on the basis of the facilities of the municipal hospital in Etropole, which will be closed down as a separate juridical person, the Endoprostheses Clinic of the Scientific Research Orthopedic and Traumatology Institute (NIOT) of the Medical Academy and the Rehabilitation Base of the Scientific Research Institute of Orthopedics and Traumatology of the Medical Academy in Boykovets Village, Sofia Oblast, whose assets and liabilities as per the balance sheet of 31 December 1989 and their other rights and obligations, will be assumed.

Appendix No. 5 to Point 1

Section I

Amendments and Supplements to the Regulation on the Application of the Law on Public Health

(Published in DV No. 31, 1974; amended, No. 99, 1980).

1. In Article 5, paragraph 1, the words "Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare" will be replaced with the words "Ministry of Economics and Planning."

2. Article 8 will be amended as follows:

—1. Paragraph 2 will be amended to read as follows:

"(2) Labor contracts with chairmen of labor-expert medical commissions (TELK) will be signed by the chairmen of the executive committees of the respective municipal people's councils, coordinated with the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare."

—2. In paragraph 3 the words "Public Health Departments" of okrug people's councils or, respectively, "the Sofia City People's Council (SGNS), in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health" will be replaced with the words "municipal people's councils,

coordinated with the commissions for social activities of oblast people's councils."

3. In Article 11, paragraph 2, the words "okrug" and "okrugs" will be replaced, respectively, with "oblast" and "municipal;" the words "okrug councils of the Bulgarian Trade Unions" will be replaced with the words "municipal councils of Bulgarian Trade Unions;" the words "labor cooperative farms" will be deleted.

4. Article 15 will be amended as follows:

—1. Item 1 will be amended as follows:

"1. By decision of the executive committees of municipal people's councils, when individual settlements within the municipality are affected or threatened;"

—2. In item 2 the words "okrug" and "the entire okrug" will be replaced, respectively, with the words "municipal" and "the entire municipality."

—3. In item 3 the word "okrugs" will be replaced by "municipalities."

5. Article 17, paragraph 1, will be amended to read as follows:

"(1) The following are the specialized authorities of state sanitary control: the Health Prevention and State Sanitary Control Directorate and the Inspectorate for Resort Resources and Resorts of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare; the State Institute for Control of Medicinal Means; Hygiene-Epidemiological Inspectorates."

6. Article 22 will be amended as follows:

—1. In paragraph 1 the words "city and okrug" will be replaced with the word "municipal."

—2. In paragraph 2 the words "Hygiene-Epidemiological Administration" will be replaced with the words "Health Prevention and State Sanitary Control Directorate."

7. In Article 23, paragraph 1, the words "city and okrug" will be replaced with the word "municipal."

8. In Article 24 the words "Ministry of Construction and Architecture" will be replaced with the words "Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Urban Works."

9. In Article 26 the words "Hygiene-Epidemiological Administration" will be replaced with "Health Prevention and State Sanitary Control Directorate."

10. A new article 53a will be created, to read as follows:

"Article 53a. (1) AIDS patients are subject to mandatory treatment, including placement in a specialized hospital at their place of residence, by instruction of the chief physician of the institution which will also set the duration of the treatment."

(2) Individuals contaminated with the AIDS virus are subject to mandatory outpatient observation by the skin and venereal diseases outpatient clinic at their place of residence. The observation will include control examinations, tests, and treatment as defined by the treating physician. The duration of the outpatient clinic observation will be determined by its chief physician.

(3) Carriers of the AIDS virus will be informed in writing by the health authorities that they have become contaminated and that they must observe the recommendations of the health authorities with a view to preventing the contamination with the AIDS virus of relatives and other citizens.

(4) Carriers of the AIDS virus, whose behavior and lifestyle threaten the spreading of the disease among the population and the members of their families will be mandatorily placed in specialized hospitals as per paragraph 1, with the assistance of the authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the people's councils."

11. In Article 87 the words "Ministry of Foreign Trade" will be replaced with the words "Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations."

12. Article 94 is deleted.

13. In Article 99, paragraph 2, the word "okrug" will be replaced with the word "municipal."

14. In Article 109 the words "Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare" will be replaced with the words "and the Ministry of Economics and Planning."

15. In Article 111, item 2, the words "public health departments of okrug people's councils" will be replaced with the words "municipal people's councils."

17. Article 113 will be amended as follows:

—1. In paragraph 1 the words "Ministry of Energy" will be replaced with "Committee for Geology."

—2. In paragraph 4, at the end of the paragraph, the words "and the municipal people's council on whose territory they have been opened" will be added.

18. Article 114 will be amended as follows:

"Article 114. Discovered and studied mineral water sources, mineral waters, and treatment mud deposits will be managed by the municipal people's councils on whose territory they are located. Mineral springs and waters which are operationally inefficient will be isolated without disturbing the natural conditions of the deposit and on the basis of the mandatory stipulations of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and at the expense of the investor in the project."

19. Article 116 will be amended to read as follows:

"Article 116. The study of existing resort resources in terms of material, energy, physiological, and clinical respects will be conducted by the Ministry of Public

Health and Social Welfare, the Medical Academy, and other scientific institutions, with the cooperation of interested municipal people's councils."

20. Article 119 will be amended to read as follows:

"Article 119. (1) The minister of public health and social welfare approves the operational reserves of mineral springs, mineral waters, and medicinal mud deposits on the basis of the reports submitted by survey organizations and scientific institutes.

"(2) Mineral springs, mineral waters, and medicinal mud deposits may not be used without proven operational reserves."

21. Article 120 will be amended to read as follows:

"Article 120. The amounts of mineral waters and medicinal mud, needed to meet the requirements of treatment and sanatorium-resort establishments, will be established by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare. They will be given to the municipal people's councils free of charge. The remaining quantities of mineral waters will be provided by the municipal people's councils for economic and other purposes against pay at set prices."

22. In Article 127, paragraph 1, and Article 130, paragraph 3, the words "labor cooperative farms" will be deleted.

23. In Article 129, paragraph 2, the words "State Committee for Planning" and "Ministry of Construction and Architecture" will be replaced, respectively, with the words "Ministry of Economics and Planning" and "Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Urban Works."

24. Article 144 will be amended to read as follows:

"Article 144. Labor contracts with legal counsel in charge of social-legal offices of health establishments of people's councils will be concluded by the chairmen of the executive committees of the respective municipal people's councils."

25. Everywhere in the regulation the words "minister of public health" and "the minister of public health" and "Ministry of Public Health (MNZ)" will be replaced, respectively, with "minister of public health and social welfare," "the minister of public health and social welfare," and "Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare (MNZSG)."

Section II

Amendments and Supplements to the Regulation on Medical-Sanitary Protection of the Bulgarian People's Republic From Quarantinable and Other Dangerous Contagious Diseases (DV No. 32, 1974).

26. In Article 1 the words "and recurrent fever" are replaced with "recurrent fever and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)."

27. In Article 2 the words "National Agroindustrial Union" are replaced with "the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry."

28. Article 5, paragraph 1, will be amended as follows:

—1. In item 1 the words "republic anti-epidemics station" is replaced with "Health Prevention and State Sanitary Control Directorate."

—2. In item 3 the word "okrug" is replaced with "municipal."

29. In Article 7, paragraph 2, the word "okrug" is replaced with "municipal," and the words "Committee for Relaxation and Tourism, coordinated with the leading authorities" is replaced with "tourist organizations."

30. In Article 8, paragraph 3, the words "public health departments under okrug" are replaced with "municipal."

31. In Article 11 the words "State Committee for Planning" and "Ministry of Supplies and State Reserves" are replaced, respectively, with "Ministry of Economics and Planning" and "Committee for Material Resources."

32. In Article 12, item 5, the words "rayons and okrugs" are replaced with "mayoralties, municipalities, and oblasts."

33. In Article 20a the word "okrugs" is replaced with "municipalities."

34. In Article 23 the word "okrug" is replaced with "municipal and oblast."

35. In the entire regulation the words "minister of public health," "the minister of public health," and "the Ministry of Public Health (MNZ)" are respectively replaced with "minister of public health and social welfare," "the minister of public health and social welfare," and "the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare (MNZSG)."

Section III

Amendments and Supplements to Regulation No. 56 of the Council of Ministers of 1980 on Improving the Administration of Health Care and Social Welfare Organizations and Establishments (DV No. 91, 1980)

36. In Article 1, paragraph 2, the words "okrug and" are deleted.

37. In Article 5, item 1, the word "okrug" is replaced with "municipal."

38. In Article 1, paragraph 1, the words "State Committee for Planning" are replaced with "Ministry of Economics and Planning."

39. In Article 11 the words "State Committee for Planning" are replaced with "Ministry of Economics and Planning," and "State Committee for Tourism" with "Bulgarian Association for Tourism and Recreation."

40. In Article 13 the words "Committee for Labor and Wages" are replaced with "Ministry of Economics and Planning."

41. In item 1, paragraph 1 of the concluding stipulations, the word "okrug" is replaced with "municipal."

42. In the entire resolution, the words "minister of public health," "the minister of public health," and "Ministry of Public Health (MNZ)" are respectively replaced with "minister of public health and social welfare," "the minister of public health and social welfare," and "Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare (MNZSG)."

Section IV

Amendments and Supplements to the Regulation on the Organization of Health Care Shops (DV No. 1, 1986)

43. Article 12 is amended to read as follows:

—1. In paragraph 1 the word "okrugs" is replaced with "oblasts," and the word "KTSD" is replaced with "Ministry of Economics and Planning."

—2. In paragraph 2 the words "settlement systems" are replaced with "municipalities."

—3. Paragraph 3 will be amended to read as follows:

"(3) Memberships of the oblast coordination councils will be approved by the chairmen of the executive committees of the oblast people's councils and the memberships of municipal coordination councils by the chairmen of the executive committees of municipal people's councils and the chairmen of the municipal councils of trade unions."

—4. In paragraph 4 the word "KTSD" will be replaced with "Ministry of Economics and Planning."

Section V

Amendments and Supplements to Resolution No. 38 of the Council of Ministers of 1979 on Further Improvements in Child Health Care (DV No. 63, 1979)

44. In Article 6, paragraph 1, and Article 10 the word "okrug" is replaced with "municipal."

45. In Article 13 the words "Ministry of Foreign Trade" and "Ministry of Supplies and State Reserves" are respectively replaced with "Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations" and "Committee for Material Resources."

46. In Article 16 the words "okrug and rayon" are deleted; the word "okrugs" is replaced with "municipalities," and the words "Committee for Labor and Wages" are replaced with "Ministry of Economics and Planning."

47. In Article 19, item 3, the words "okrug and rayon" are deleted.

48. In the entire resolution the words "minister of public health" and "Ministry of Public Health (MNZ)" are respectively replaced with "minister of public health and social welfare" and "Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare (MNZSG)."

Appendix No. 6 to Item 2

Amendments and Supplements to the Regulation on Additional Wages for Hazardous and Other Specific Labor Conditions (DV Nos. 9 and 10, 1987; corrected, No. 33, 1987; amended, Nos 54 and 81, 1988 and No. 3, 1989)

1. In Article 90, paragraph 2 the figures "30 and 40" are replaced with "60."

2. Article 91 will be amended to read as follows:

—1. Paragraph 1 is deleted.

—2. In paragraph 5 the figure "1" and the words "house or" are deleted.

—3. In paragraph 6 the figure "1" is deleted.

3. Article 92 is amended and supplemented as follows:

—1. In paragraph 1 the figure "24" is replaced with "30."

—2. The following new paragraphs 3 and 4 are added:

"(3) The following will be paid to the medical personnel engaged in surgery, reanimation, and anesthetics:

—1. Physicians and dentists, no more than 100 leva;

—2. Secondary medical cadres, no more than 60 leva;

—3. Orderlies, no more than 30 leva.

(4) Additional pay not to exceed 40 leva will be given to drivers of emergency and first medical aid vehicles."

4. In Article 143, item 5, the word "inpatient" is deleted.

HUNGARY

Broadcast Frequency Shortage Discussed

90CH0002A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 17 Feb 90 pp 71-72

[Interview with Kalman Toth, director of Frequency Allocation Division in the Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunications, and Construction, by Endre Babus; place and date not given: "The Electronic Press: Clogged Channels"—first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] The passage of press laws, modified in January, which grants even private citizens the right to set up radio or television studios, is still nothing more than written word. Due to the moratorium placed on the allocation of frequencies, no new studios can begin broadcasting. No one knows how long this enforced

hiatus may last; at least that is the impression one gets from a conversation with Kalman Toth, Director of the Frequency Allocation Division in the Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunications, and Construction.

[HVG] Since July 1989 there has been a ban on issuing broadcasting permits to new radio and television enterprises. Yet, according to recent rumors, others, such as the Voice of America, will start broadcasting from Hungary as early as 15 March this year.

[Toth] Yes, I have heard, too, that that broadcaster wishes to establish a studio in our country. However, I do not know if the programs prepared in that studio would be broadcast to Hungarian listeners. Our office has not received an application containing such information.

[HVG] News of this type seldom begins circulating without any basis. According to many people, it is conceivable that (like the "Sun-TV," which started broadcasting during the moratorium) various tricks will be used to introduce new TV programs.

[Toth] I would not like to see events confused. When we announced the moratorium, we had applications for 29 radio and 32 TV stations on file. Among the 61 applicants, there were some who already had permits to broadcast, complete studio equipment, and a ready editorial staff, and only were waiting for the delivery of broadcasting equipment. Several cities among them, such as Szombathely or Debrecen, had spent about 10 million forints on setting up local television studios, yet, because of the moratorium, they still could not begin operations. Speaking for myself, I completely disagree with freezing municipal projects that are nearly operational. This is why we at the Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunications, and Construction (KOHÉM) have compiled a list of those studios or stations (about a half dozen of these exist), in whose case it would be a mistake to further deny broadcast permits simply because there is a moratorium. As for "Sun-TV," it could begin broadcasting, because it had already acquired the required permits before the moratorium went into effect, and because it uses the broadcasting facilities of TV-1, instead of setting up its own. I must state categorically, however, that not one of the applicants that came to us after the moratorium has been granted a permit, and, naturally, we have no intention of changing this practice.

[HVG] Mass communications in today's Hungary are characterized by a strange phenomenon. The direct party control that used to cripple the newspapers is, by and large, a thing of the past, while in the case of electronic media which reaches the greatest audience, the state invokes technical reasons for not allowing the development of free competition.

[Toth] Last spring, when the feverish rush to establish radio and TV studios began in Hungary, it immediately came to light that, in accordance with the existing laws, the new national and regional channels cannot be authorized. Yet, nearly everyone referred to the inadequate

technical facilities when justifying the introduction of the moratorium. In fact, that was the first time the government found itself facing some basic issues of mass communications, such as: What should the proportional size of central and local, or state-owned and private broadcasters, be, or what future limitations should be placed on commercial programming in Hungary? In theory, the moratorium was introduced to give the government time to make decisions concerning these newly emerging issues.

[HVG] For months the Council of Ministers kept saying that it would create new laws on postal and press affairs to take care of the above issues. To this day, this promise has not been fulfilled. It would not hurt if, at last, they would reveal how many radio and television programs can be broadcast in Hungary today.

[Toth] When it comes to this question, several grave misconceptions are commonly held. Many people have the view that we technicians have merely to list the available frequencies, after which the only task is for someone or some agency to allocate these in the correct manner. In fact, however, this should not be seen in the same light as the allocation of a given amount of newsprint among the various newspapers. After all, in theory there is no limit to the number of programs that could be broadcast in Hungary. At the same time, it is undoubtable that, due to international agreements, we can only dispose of a definite amount of frequencies. The question you posed may be likened to the question: How many houses could be built in Hungary? Obviously, one would have to clarify at least a few questions before one could give an answer. In our case, we would have to know, for example, the location and nature of broadcasting facilities under consideration, and this has not been explained to us to this day.

[HVG] Do you have any suggestions, for example, on what the proportion of state-owned and privately owned electronic communication facilities should be?

[Toth] We have worked out several proposals along that line, but we are not the ones making the decisions. In order to illustrate our concept, let us consider the present

situation in television programming. As of now, Hungarian Television uses only about 50 percent of the programming time reserved for it on two channels. At the same time, there are several dozen firms that are waiting for permits to initiate independent programming. In my view, we should not be intimidated by the idea of the state taking the capacity left unused by Hungarian Television and sell it, perhaps at auctions, at the prevailing market prices.

[HVG] In your estimate, how much profit would this bring to the national budget?

[Toth] We have no data for that. However, it would be worth recalling that Hungary's TV-1 broadcasting network, and especially the TV-2 network, are far from being developed to their fullest extent. If we were to sell even a portion of broadcasting facilities left unutilized by Hungarian Television, the profits thus gained could be used for enlarging the broadcasting network. For myself, I would find it feasible in the future to allow domestic or foreign firms to construct the facilities used to broadcast state-sponsored programs, in return for which they would be compelled to broadcast state programs between 2000 and 2300 hours. The remaining time they could use in accordance with their concepts. We could also stipulate that entrepreneurs could retain ownership of the stations they have built for ten years, after which they would have to turn them over to the state. In subsequent years, the state would broadcast its own programs via the previously private facilities.

[HVG] Many people feel that the possibility still exists for Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television to sell their allocated frequencies "under the table" to private firms. There is the rumor, for example, that a certain Agro TV will begin broadcasting in the near future via one of Hungarian Television's channels. It is said that several political parties, which count on receiving a number of ballots from the countryside, are quite supportive of this idea.

[Toth] Indeed, such initiatives exist. However, as stipulated by the moratorium, as long as there is a freeze on allocating frequencies, we are not issuing permits to undertake this type of broadcasting activities.

"Frozen" Applications for Starting Radio or TV Stations (National or Regional)

Applicant	Type of Program	Character of Program	Time Span	Area Coverage
Co-Nexus, Incorporated	Radio	Commercial	16 hrs./day	North Transdanubia
Radio Bridge	Radio	English language, entertainment, commercial	24 hrs.	Budapest
Trans-Pannonia	Radio	Austro-Hungarian, commercial	12 hrs.	Eastern Austria, Burgenland
Unternehmens Werbeberatung Radnai	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Within 40 km of Szeged
Penzugykutato, Incorporated, Pannon TV Tarsasag, Limited	TV	Ethnic	12 hrs./day	Hungary and Burgenland
Pecs Regional Studio	TV	Commercial	Twice weekly (2300-0100)	South Transdanubia

"Frozen" Applications for Starting Radio or TV Stations (National or Regional) (Continued)

Applicant	Type of Program	Character of Program	Time Span	Area Coverage
Movi-Nap TV, Limited	TV	Commercial	Daily 0530-0830	Hungary
Tarsadalmi TV	TV	Political programs of dissident organizations	Mondays	Hungary
Szobotka-Consult GMBH	TV	Commercial	Not given	Vienna and region
Szobotka-Consult GMBH	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Vienna and region
Laszlo Hanko	TV	Commercial	Not given	Budapest
Radio Pannonia	Radio	Commercial	Not given	South-West Hungary
Budapest Radio	Radio-TV	Public affairs, politics	24 hrs.	Budapest
Echo Mass Communications, Limited	TV	Service	10 hrs./day	Balaton and region
Budapest-Vienna World Exposition	Radio-TV	Commercial, cultural	Not given	Austria
Controll Co-op.	Radio	Advertising, economic policies	3 hrs. twice daily	Budapest
World Exposition-Budapest Council	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Budapest
Pannonia-Media	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Austro-Hungarian border region
National Commercial and Credit Bank, Incorporated	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Nation-wide
Interedition	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Sopron region
Balaton management council	Radio	Informative	Not given	Balaton
Continental-Industrial Company	Radio	Commercial	Not given	All highways
Aero-Caritas	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Highways
Galileo Radio	Radio	Commercial	Not given	Budapest
Nepszabadsag	Radio	Informative	Not given	National
Italian-Hungarian Joint Enterprise	TV	Youth policies	4 hrs. twice daily	Budapest
Youth Community TV (KISZ CC)	TV	Youth issues	4 hrs. twice daily	Budapest
Hungarian Postal Service (Budapest commercial channel)	TV	Commercial	Not given	Budapest
MAFILM	TV	Entertainment, pop. information, advertising	8 hrs./day	Budapest
Budapest Youth (KISZ-DEMISZ)	Radio	Youth issues, commercial	1200-1400 daily	Budapest
Union of Musicians	Radio	Entertainment, commercial	16 hrs./day	Budapest and region
Szekesfeharvar Municipal Council	Radio	Not given	Not given	Szesfeharvar and Lake Velence

The KOHEM has 38 additional applications on file.

Source: Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunications, and Construction

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